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Abstract
The recent years have seen an enormous advance in wireless communication
technology and co-existence of various types of wireless networks, which requires
effective inter-networking among the heterogeneous wireless networks in order
to support user roaming over the networks while maintaining the connectivity.
One of main challenges to achieve the connectivity over heterogeneous wireless
networks is potential intermittent connections caused by user roaming. The
issue is how to maintain the connection as the user roams and how to ensure
service quality in the presence of a long disconnection period.
In this dissertation, we apply the delay tolerant network (DTN) framework
to heterogeneous terrestrial wireless networks, and propose a system architec-
ture to achieve the connectivity in the presence of excessive long delays and
intermittent paths. We study several possible approaches, discuss the applica-
bility of each of the approaches and propose the super node architecture. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed super node architecture, we give
a simulation study that compares the system performance under the super node
architecture and under the epidemic based architecture.
Within the proposed architecture that employs the idea of super nodes, we
further study how to effectively route a message over access networks. We
present a new routing technique for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) based
on the DTN system architecture. We introduce the concept of virtual network
topology and redefine the dominating-set based routing for the challenged net-
work environment under consideration. In addition, we propose a time based
methodology to predict the probability of future contacts between node pairs
to construct the virtual network topology. We present a simulation study that
demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed routing approach as compared
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with the epidemic routing, and that the time based technique for predicting the
future contacts gives better performance compared with that using the number
of previous contacts.
We further extend the dominating set routing technique through analyzing
the underlying node mobility model. We shed some light on how using node
mobility model can improve contact probability estimation. Based on our find-
ings we propose a new algorithm that improves the routing performance by
minimizing the selected dominating set size.
Information security challenges in the super node architecture are intro-
duced. We further address two main security challenges: The first is how to
prevent unauthorized nodes from using the network resources, and the second is
how to achieve end-to-end secure message exchange over the network. Our pro-
posed solutions are based on asymmetric key cryptography techniques. More-
over, we introduce a new idea of separating the problem of source authentication
from the problem of message authorization. We propose a new technique that
employs the one-way key chain to use symmetric key cryptographic techniques
to address the problems under consideration.
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Over the recent years, wireless technology has been gaining momentum with a
wide spread of wireless networks. Various types of wireless networks have been
deployed and widely used, such as 3rd-generation cellular networks, wireless lo-
cal area networks (WLANs), sensor networks, and mesh networks. Each type
of network is optimized for a specific networking environment, and it is impos-
sible to have only one type of wireless network that suits all the environments.
The global information transport platform via internetworking has become an
incontrovertible fact, regardless of the differences among these networks either
in structure or in protocols used over them. This leads to the existence of
heterogeneous wireless networking.
Achieving continuous connection for roaming users over heterogeneous wire-
less networks is a difficult (if not impossible) task due to many challenges. One
main challenge is how to overcome intermittent connections to users. Inter-
mittent connections cause problems not only for users roaming over different
networks, but also for users staying connected to the same network. We pro-
pose [1–7] a system architecture that overcomes these problems by adopting the
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recently proposed delay tolerant network (DTN) architecture.
1.1 Intermittent Connections
One main problem facing wireless networks is the gaps in network coverage,
which causes frequent disconnections and reconnections. These intermittent
connections introduce a serious challenge to preserve user sessions especially for
a long disconnection period.
No general solution for the problem of intermittent connections has been
proposed. Most of the work done to overcome the problem depends mainly
on modifying the application layer protocols or using a middleware layer to
tolerate these intermittent connections for specific applications. For example,
to make transactions resilient to intermittent connections, a middleware called
MobileTrans is employed in [8] to force the transactions to adapt to the mobile
environment. In [9], the transaction throughput is increased by increasing the
execution time and relaxing the consistency properties of transactions. Making
a file system resilient to intermittent connections is addressed by many research
efforts such as the PRAYER file system (PFS) [10] that creates a mobility-aware
file system. Also, the work in [11] addresses how to enhance the web searching
for intermittent connected users. This is done by using an Internet proxy to
prefetch pages in order to increase the number of relevant results returned to
mobile users during their limited connectivity times.
Another reason of having intermittent connections is user roaming over dif-
ferent networks, such as cellular networks, wireless local area networks, and
mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). The problem here is more complicated
because, upon reconnection at a different network, the user identity (e.g., IP
address) will be changed. Achieving continuous connectivity in this case implies
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a migration of the user’s connection information to the new jurisdiction (i.e.,
network). The problem gets even more complicated when the networks have
different owners. Many solutions are proposed [12] for addressing the problem
of achieving seamless mobility for roaming users. These solutions focus on dif-
ferent layers of the protocol stack. Some solutions are based on the network
layer such as IDMB [13], Mobile IP [14], Cellular IP [15], and HAWAII [16],
while some others are based on the link layer [17–19]. There are also solutions
based on cross-layer design between the link layer and the network layer [20–23].
A problem with all these techniques is mainly due to the potential long dis-
connection period. When a user is disconnected for an extended period, all these
techniques will time out and terminate all the user connections. This makes the
techniques unsuitable when no restrictions are assumed on the disconnection
time. This research addresses the problem by proposing a new technique to
tolerate intermittent connections and long disconnection periods.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research mainly studies the problem of maintaining the connectivity to
a user while the user roams over interconnected heterogeneous wireless net-
works. We address the problem of intermittent connections by applying the
DTN framework.
Our main objective is to develop network control algorithms and protocols
for providing a virtually continuous connection to roaming users over intercon-
nected heterogeneous wireless networks. Any user can leave the current network
and disconnect for a period of time. Then the user can reconnect to the same
network or another wireless network while continuing with the old session as if
no disconnection occurred.
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To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has addressed this prob-
lem. Some previous studies have investigated the problem of providing a seam-
less roaming. The previous techniques cannot maintain the user connection in
the presence of potential long disconnections. Dealing with the interconnected
heterogeneous wireless networks as a challenged network is the key issue in
our research based on the DTN architecture for message exchanges. This new
formulation of the problem poses new constraints and new challenges such as
in routing and in supporting information security. Many research works have
addressed DTN routing and security issues, but they either cannot be directly
applied to our problem domain or they are totally inapplicable. We will discuss
these technique and compare them with our proposed techniques.
Our research goals include:
• Introducing a networking architecture for message exchanges. This archi-
tecture should ensure virtually continuous connectivity for roaming users;
• Providing a routing strategy that guarantees successful message delivery
with efficient network resource utilization;
• Ensuring system security in terms of end-to-end secure message exchanges
and authorized access to system resources.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews some important back-
ground on challenged networks and the DTN architecture, and presents a brief
review of important research issues in DTN routing. Chapter 3 describes the sys-
tem model and proposes the new networking architecture based on super nodes.
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Also, it presents a comparison between the proposed architecture and other pos-
sible approaches supported by a simulation study. Chapter 4 discusses routing
over the proposed networking architecture and introduces a novel technique
for routing over MANETs. Chapter 5 extends the proposed routing technique
based on node mobility analysis and discusses how the routing performance can
be improved. Chapter 6 introduces two main security challenges within the
proposed system architecture. It reviews some research efforts that adapt the
traditional asymmetric techniques to achieve security over DTN and then in-
troduces two novel techniques based on a one-way key chain to provide secure
message delivery and to prevent unauthorized node from using the network.





The DTN architecture [24] is recently introduced to facilitate communications
in and internetworking for challenged networks.
2.1 Challenged Networks
Challenged networks [25] are networks that satisfy one or both of the following
characteristics:
• The communications path between a data source and its destination may
never exist;
• The time to send a message from a source to the destination is excessive,
e.g., due to limited bandwidth, error probability, or path instability.
Of course, regular networks may exhibit these properties as well, but it is as-
sumed that these properties are rarely encountered and can be neglected for
6
protocol design in regular networks. Regular networks always depend on the
existence of an end-to-end path to achieve successful communications. As a
result, the protocols developed for regular networks fail to function when used
for communications over challenged networks. Challenged networks need new
communication protocols that suit the hostile networking environment.
To better explain the nature of challenged networks, we discuss some network
examples in the following.
• Medium challenged networks : This category contains many network types
such as near-earth satellite communications, long distance optical [26] and
radio communications (as in deep space communications [27, 28] and un-
derwater communications [29–31]). Main characteristics of these networks
are a very long delay encountered, frequent disconnections, or unavailabil-
ity of the communications link. For example, the movement of a satellite
over its orbit causes the connection to be available only at specific times.
Some of the disconnections in such networks can be predicted or even
scheduled, which can improve message routing.
• Sparse mobile ad-hoc networks : The mobile ad-hoc networks are networks
with no infrastructure or centralized administration. In spite of the nature
of mobile ad-hoc networks, successful communications have been achieved
over such type of networks by cooperation among the nodes to maintain
multi-hop network connectivity [32–41]. Many techniques have been pro-
posed and deployed for path discovery and packet routing over mobile
ad-hoc networks such as AODV [32], DSR [35] and DSDV [38]. All of
these routing techniques are proposed under the assumption that there is
an end-to-end path between the source and the destination. If the path
does not exist, the techniques will announce failure. Sparse mobile ad-hoc
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networks [41–45] are characterized by frequent network partitioning that
may last for an extended period; so maintaining the multi-hop connectiv-
ity becomes infeasible.
• Sensor networks : These networks [46] are mainly characterized by limited
end-node capabilities in terms of memory, processing, and power [47]. A
sensor network in general consists of a number of sensors that collect data
and report these data back to an entity usually called the sink. The size of
the network can be in a range of thousands or even millions of nodes. The
field of sensor networks has seen extensive research efforts [48–51]. Due
to node limited power and sparse nature of the network, an end-to-end
physical path is difficult to be established, so data communications can
be done through different techniques such as using data mules [52]. One
of the main applications of this type of networks is wildlife tracking [36].
• Vehicular networks : Vehicular networks [53–55] are expected to be a main
component of intelligent transportation systems (ITS). They allow vehi-
cles to communicate with each other as well as with roadside base stations.
The main goal of the vehicular networks is to enhance road safety and im-
prove transportation efficiency. Advances in vehicular networks will lead
to potential use of vehicles as a data carrier to provide a communications
facility between communicating parties that a vehicle encounters during
its travel [44, 56, 57]. Due to frequent partitioning of the network, a
source node may be unable to establish an end-to-end physical path with
the destination node.
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2.1.1 Store and Forward Mechanism
When the existence of an end-to-end path is unlikely, one way for message
delivery over challenged networks is through asynchronous message forwarding,
also known as the store and forward mechanism.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the store and forward message delivery mechanism.
Consider a simple example as shown in Figure 2.1, a node, A, wants to send
a message to a node, B. However, there is no path (either direct or indirect)
between nodes A and B. Node C is a mobile node that can communicate with
A at time T1 and communicate with B at time T2, where T2 > T1. As node
C moves from node A to node B, node A can send the message to node C at
time T1. Node C stores the message and then forwards it to node B at time
T2. Unlike regular networks, the path A→ C → B is a virtual path that never
fully exists at any time instance. The key step of the communication process is
that, node C stores the message and forwards it to the destination or to another
intermediate node at a right time.
Challenged networks face mainly two kinds of the challenges: 1) the non-
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existence of a path between the communicating parties, and 2) the long com-
munications delay. Indeed, the first challenge can be viewed as a special case of
the second challenge.
The previous discussion addresses a simple scenario consisting of only one
intermediate node. Routing over challenged networks is to find an intermediate
node, or more generally a sequence of intermediate nodes for message forwarding
from its source to its destination. This problem is similar to the routing problem
in regular networks. However, regular network routing techniques search for a
physical end-to-end path, but not a virtual path.
2.1.2 Delay Tolerant Network Architecture
There exist various types of challenged networks, each with its own protocols
that limit the possibility of internetworking among different types of networks
without the need of a highly specialized proxy. The delay tolerant network
architecture [25, 28] is introduced for communications over challenged networks
and to help the interoperability among challenged networks. It also facilitates
internetworking among challenged networks and regular networks.
The need for a new network protocol architecture is due to the unsuitabil-
ity of the existing communications protocols for communication over challenged
networks. Both network layer and transport layer protocols for regular networks
fail to adapt due to long delays and/or the absence of an end-to-end physical
path. For example, the Internet routing protocols depend on receiving manage-
ment messages on regular intervals to discover and keep the paths. With no
existence of a physical path and with a long message delay, these protocols will
not function properly. Routing protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks do not do
better over these networks for the same reason. Both proactive protocols and
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reactive protocols assume the existence of an end-to-end physical path. As a
result, they fail to adapt to the intermittent nature of the paths in the system.
Even if a physical end-to-end path is discovered by the network layer, conven-
tional transport layer protocols may still fail to work over challenged networks.
Connection oriented transport protocols will either fail to establish a connection
or falsely detect a disconnection due to long delays encountered. For example,
the Transport Control Protocol ( TCP) will fail because it will time out. This
can happen at any phase of the protocol operation. It may happen at the con-
nection setup phase due to the required negotiations. Even if a connection is
established, the increasing round-trip latency will demolish the throughput of
the TCP over such networks. It will cause the protocol to either falsely detect
lost data and start a retransmission or falsely detect a congestion and reduce
its transmission rate. The TCP must deliver the data in order, which implies
that any lost data will need retransmission. The lost data will also prevent the
delivery of all subsequent transmitted data on the same connection, until it is
being successfully delivered. This is impractical for a DTN because it limits the
data that can be successfully transferred over the existing path. Considering
the short life time of a path, it is clear that connection oriented protocols should
not be used.
Connectionless transport protocols such as the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) are more suitable for communication over challenged networks. They do
not require a connection setup and they do not perform any kind of handshaking
to ensure message delivery and its order. However, using them will move these
functions to a higher layer (e.g., the application layer), which does not solve
the problem. This makes the connectionless transport protocols (indirectly)
unsuitable for a DTN as well.
One solution for the problem under consideration is to change the existing
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protocols to tolerate the potential delay over challenged networks. This solution
is impractical, especially if we consider internetworking among challenged net-
works or between them and regular networks. Another solution is introduced
in [28] that uses a middleware layer. The idea is first introduced to create con-
nectivity with nodes located deeply in space (e.g., spacecraft). This implies to
connect separate network environments characterized by significantly different
sets of physical and operational constraints. The proposed architecture is based
on the Internet-independent middleware so that it can use a protocol stack that
best suits each environment. The work in [25] generalizes the DTN architecture
for all challenged networks. The new layer is called the bundle layer, which
is added between the application and transport layers in the protocol stack as
shown in Figure 2.2. This new layer serves to bridge between different stacks at
the boundaries between different networking environments in a standard man-
ner.
Figure 2.2: The new bundle layer in the protocol stack.
Due to long transmission latency and intermittent paths, the data transmit-
ted should be self-contained. There must be no reliance on any kind of hand-
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shaking (i.e., negotiations) or connection setup. The units of data are termed
bundles (which are similar to email messages). The main function of the bundle
layer is to handle sending and receiving of bundles across the network using the
underlying protocol stack. It also should hide the nature of the communication
environments from the upper layers (mainly the application layer).
2.2 Routing Over DTN
Unlike regular network routing techniques, DTN routing techniques search for
a virtual path. In general, the goals for routing techniques in a DTN can be
summarized as:
1. Message delivery: To ensure successful message delivery is the main goal
for DTN routing techniques.
2. Resources utilization: There is always a trade-off between efficient resource
utilization and improving message delivery rate. Routing algorithms try
to achieve the best message delivery rate with efficient resource utiliza-
tion. The resources include node buffer space, transmission power and
bandwidth.
3. Latency minimization: Although transmissions over a DTN are expected
to have long delays, routing techniques try to minimize the long delays as
much as possible.
Successful message delivery in a DTN depends on contacts between a mes-
sage holder and the message destination. The contact can be defined as an
opportunity of transmitting and receiving data between two nodes when they
fall in each other transmission range for a specific duration. Routing techniques
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in a DTN can be classified based on the type of contacts in the network. Con-
tacts in a DTN belong to one of the following categories:
• Opportunistic: There is no information available about contact time or
place.
• Scheduled: It is exactly known in advance when, where and for how long
a contact will take place.
• Predicted: A prediction of a contact is made based on previous observa-
tions such as the last time of meeting or the frequency of meetings among
nodes.
There have been many research efforts in DTN routing, some of them are
discussed in the following.
2.2.1 Opportunistic Routing
Epidemic routing [58–61] is considered the main technique for opportunistic
routing. In epidemic routing, a message source forwards the message to all nodes
it encounters. These nodes are called carriers. When any two carriers meet,
they exchange their carried messages. Message delivery is accomplished when
the message destination contacts any message carrier. The main assumption for
this technique to succeed is that the node mobility allows any two nodes to move
randomly into the communications range of one another. Figure 2.3 shows a
partitioned mobile ad-hoc network that contains two disconnected sets of mobile
nodes. When node, A, wants to send a message, m, to node, B, it forwards
the message to all the nodes it encounters (i.e., node C, and node D). These
nodes will become carriers for the message. Each carrier sends the message to
all the other nodes it encounters. Each node keeps a vector of all messages it
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Figure 2.3: Epidemic routing.
contains. When a contact occurs between two nodes, they first exchange their
vectors and then they exchange only the messages that are missing. Node C
will not send m to node D because node A already sent it to node D. Due to
the network partitioning, the message will not be delivered until a carrier comes
into contact with a member of the other set that contains the destination node.
Node D contacts node F and node H during its mobility outside its set border.
When the message reaches one of the set members, it starts to propagate to all
the set members until it is delivered to the destination (i.e., node B).
In the previous scenario, there is no need to send the message to nodes
C,E,G,H. It would be much more efficient if node A sends the message to
node D only, and node D forwards the message to node F . The unnecessary
forwarding of the message consumes resources. This deficiency cannot be over-
come under the assumption that no information about the system is available.
Epidemic routing tries to create multiple copies of the message over a set
of nodes to improve the message delivery rate and delay. In the scenario of
Figure 2.3, assuming that node C will meet one of the nodes in the other set
nodes, such as node F , node C can send the message to node F , which will
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deliver the message to node B. Node C mobility creates an alternative path
for the message delivery, but with a longer delay. As a result, epidemic routing
guarantees that the message will be delivered with a minimal delay. Due to the
message forwarding to all the nodes in contact, the destination is guaranteed
to be reached (if it can be reached). Assuming unlimited resources, epidemic
routing guarantees the best message delivery rate in addition to the minimum
latency. Unfortunately, there are some limitations imposed on the protocol in
practice, which limit its ability to achieve the minimum latency and the highest
message delivery rate:
• Buffer space: Due to limited node buffer space, a node has the right to
refuse receiving a message or even to drop some of the received messages
to prevent the buffer overflow. One of the proposals [60] suggests that
each carrier accepts the message with some probability to overcome the
buffer space limitation.
• Hub count: It is similar to the TTL field in IP packets. Each message is
allowed to be propagated for a limited number of hubs to prevent network
flooding. This negatively affects the delivery rate and the delivery latency.
Even when a message is delivered to its destination, other nodes may con-
tinue to forward the message. The protocol suggests acknowledging the recep-
tion of the message. However, this acknowledgment is intended for the original
message sender to confirm message delivery, but not to the carrier nodes to stop
forwarding the message. As a result, the hub count field is proposed to solve this
problem. Unfortunately, the hub count cannot solve this problem completely,
even at the cost of reducing the message delivery probability.
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2.2.2 Scheduled Routing Techniques
Routing in interplanetary networks [62] falls under the scheduled routing cate-
gory. Many techniques and applications have been proposed for a DTN based
on scheduled routing. One of these techniques [63] considers the network as
a directed multi-graph that may have more than one edge (i.e., link) between
nodes. This graph is time-varying, but its variations are known in advance.
In [64], the network is represented as a graph, and the breadth first search
is used to find a route between message source and the destination. Based on
known future events, the graph is periodically updated; new search is conducted
if the processed events update the graph (i.e., adding or deleting edges).
Scheduled routing techniques can use information (other than contact in-
formation) such as node available buffer space and communications load. This
implies the exchange of a lot of meta information through the network on a
regular basis, which is impractical for a DTN. Although it is difficult to achieve
in real complicated systems, a trade-off solution can be found based on the ac-
tual system constraints. All schedule based routing techniques are not suitable
for our problem domain where the movements of users cannot be controlled
or scheduled. The main assumption for our problem is the user freedom in
roaming.
2.2.3 Predicted Routing
In predicted routing, a message is forwarded to a node based on the probability
that this node is able to deliver the message. The probability is calculated based
on some criteria such as the number of previous contacts. The number of nodes
to forward the message to should be restricted by some factors such as the radio
spectrum bandwidth, the node transmission power, and buffer space.
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PROPHET [65] uses the idea that a node is most probably to meet with
nodes recently encountered. It defines a probabilistic metric called delivery
predictability, which is the probability that the node will be able to deliver
a message to the destination. Each intermediate node calculates the delivery
predictability for each known destination, records a vector of all its delivery
predictability information. When two nodes meet, they exchange their vectors.
Based on the exchanged vectors, they start exchanging messages. After the
meeting, each node increases the delivery predictability value of the other node
in its vector. Similarly, each node periodically decreases the delivery predictabil-
ity of nodes not encountered. PROPHET argues that the delivery predictability
is transitive. If node A frequently encounters node B, and node B frequently
encounters C, then node C is a good node to forward messages destined to node
A.
A more general technique that uses a utility function is introduced in [66].
This utility function represents the usefulness of a specific host as a message
next hop. This utility function is an indication that this host may meet the
destination to deliver the message. The utility function covers five components,
each representing a factor in selecting the next host:
• Most recently noticed: This is similar to the principle used in PROPHET
[65].
• Most frequently noticed: This factor examines how frequently the host
encountered the destination. It assumes that the host that encountered
the destination most frequently is more likely to encounter it next.
• Future plans: This factor is similar to the scheduled routing case.
• Power: This item is very important for networks with limited end-node
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power. The node that is expected to remain alive longer is assigned a
larger utility value.
• Rediscovery interval: This factor represents how frequently the node tries
to discover appropriate hops for carried messages.
The utility function is a weighted sum of all the factors. The weight of each
factor depends on how important the factor is regarded.
The idea of routing using a node mobility profile is introduced in [67]. It is
assumed that each node has a specific number of locations (i.e., hubs) that it
usually visits. It is argued that even if this hub list may vary, the variation will
be marginal. SOLAR-HUB protocol is a routing protocol based on mobility
profile idea. This protocol suggests that a message be routed to one or more
locations visited by the receiver when either the sender or an intermediate node
visits these hubs. The contact probability between two users is computed based
on all user’s hub-visited probabilities. It is assumed that each node knows its
next hub, so that a node forwards a message to a number of its neighbors which
have higher probabilities to visit a hub visited by the destination. Each node is
assumed to know every other node mobility, and can compute the contact prob-
abilities with every other node. The information is represented in a weighted
graph. Each node applies a variation of the Dijkstra’s algorithm to find a list
of shortest paths to every other destination. Then it maintains the next hop
for each of these paths, but at the time of forwarding, it forwards a message to
only the best k paths (where k is determined by the protocol).
A generalization that abstracts the idea of the mobility pattern is introduced
in [68]. A message is forwarded to the node that has a mobility pattern similar
to that of the destination. Each node calculates its pattern space based on the
virtual contact space, where each possible contact is an axis. The distance to
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an axis measures the probability of contact. Nodes that have different sets of
contacts or same set of contacts with different frequencies are far when calculat-
ing the distance between their mobility patterns. This distance is an indication
of the possibility of a contact among nodes.
Predication based routing techniques are more suitable for the problem un-
der consideration. There are various previous and concurrent techniques, such
as [69–76], proposed to suit different system constraints. In Chapter 4, we will
discuss in details how to adopt the concept of predicted routing to our problem
domain and proposing a novel routing technique.
2.3 Summary
This chapter provides a brief background of challenged networks. It gives a
summary of challenged networks in different categories. After the store-and-
forward technique for message delivery over challenged networks is presented,
the DTN architecture is introduced. The chapter surveys the different routing




The System Model With Super
Nodes
Our focus in this research is how to provide virtually continuous connectivity
for roaming users over heterogeneous wireless networks. Considering the inter-
connected heterogeneous wireless networks as a challenged network, we apply
the DTN architecture to terrestrial wireless communications, in order to tol-
erate the potential long delays caused by user roaming. Before discussing the
possible solutions, we describe the system model under consideration and make
necessary assumptions in the following.
3.1 The System Model
We consider a global information transport platform, which consists of the In-
ternet and a number of heterogeneous wireless networks. The wireless networks
include mobile ad-hoc networks, vehicular networks, satellite networks, cellular
networks, wireless LANs, and any other networks that allow wireless connectiv-
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ity to their users. The size of these individual networks is allowed to be large
that the interconnected heterogeneous wireless networks can support a large
number of users. We assume that the wireless networks are interconnected over
the Internet backbone [77], as shown in Figure 3.1. Each wireless network is
Figure 3.1: Heterogeneous wireless networks connected over Internet backbone.
connected to the Internet through a DTN gateway [25]. The communication
between the gateways is reliable over the Internet backbone. Here, we focus on
data communications for delay insensitive applications.
Each mobile node (i.e., user) is able to connect to the platform through a
subset of the wireless access networks that we call access networks. A node
may be connected for a period through one access network, disappear for an
extended period, and then reappear from the same access network or from a
different access network. The node connection over the access networks can be
intermittent with frequent disconnections. Any node may move and connect
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through any encountered available type of the networks. The problem is how to
maintain the connection for that node during its roaming. To better understand
the problem, consider the following simple scenario: A user is surfing the web
while walking from her car and moving to her office in a building. While she
is outside the building, she is connected through a cellular network. As she
enters the building, she is disconnected from the cellular network and remains
disconnected for a few minutes when she is in an elevator. When she reaches
her office, she is able to connect but through a WLAN this time. How to
deliver messages to the user in the presence of the disconnection? When the
disconnection continues for an extended period, how to store the messages to be
delivered to the user upon reconnection at any time and through any network?
These are the main questions of interest in this research.
To deal with a potentially long delay encountered in the presence of frequent
disconnections, the only effective way for successful message delivery is to use
the asynchronous message forwarding mechanism, known as store and forward
mechanism discussed in Section 2.1.1. It is achieved by relaying messages based
on the introduced layer (Bundle layer) in the DTN framework.
We assume that each user has a unique ID that is independent of the current
access network. This ID is different from the user ID through the network (e.g.,
IP address). This ID can be assigned through the DTN layer (i.e., the bundle
layer), so it does not interfere with the other layers. The only restriction on the
user ID is its uniqueness, so it is assigned by the network management system
(e.g., using the cellular phone number).
Supporting user roaming over heterogeneous wireless networks imposes some
requirements on the physical layer and the medium access control (MAC) layer.
These requirements involve how to design a transceiver for connecting to dif-
ferent networks. For the case of overlapping network coverage (e.g., a cellular
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network and a WLAN), the decision on which network to connect to involves
many factors such as the signal strength and the connection cost. These ques-
tions are out of the scope of our research. In this research, we assume that
the underlying layers in the protocol stack are reliable in terms of detecting,
connecting, and sending a message in the network.
3.2 Super Node Architecture for Routing
The proposed solution [7] is mainly based on using the DTN architecture so that
the applications can use functions provided by the bundle layer to communicate
with roaming users. The self-contained nature of the messages (i.e., bundles)
solves the problem of establishing and maintaining a connection with the user
to achieve reliable communications. The problem now can be reduced to three
issues.
1. Locating a node: As the node roams, its location is not fixed. The node
can be connected via any wireless network at any time. Thus, the first
challenge is to locate the destination node in order to communicate with
it.
2. Storing messages: With the expected disconnectivity and/or the possibil-
ity of no existing end-to-end path, a message to be sent to an unreachable
(e.g., disconnected) node needs to be stored at some other node(s) and to
be forwarded to the destination whenever possible.
3. Delivering stored messages: Upon destination node reconnection, the
stored messages should be delivered to the node.
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Any proposed scheme should address the three aspects of the problem. The
objectives in finding a suitable scheme should include the following.
• Reliable message delivery: Achieving successful message delivery is the
main goal. Successful message delivery should not depend on the avail-
ability of the destination node at the time of message generation.
• Efficient resources utilization: There is always a trade-off between utiliz-
ing resources efficiently and improving the message delivery probability.
In general, routing should achieve an optimum message delivery rate with
efficient resource utilization. The resources include node buffer space,
node power, and the system radio bandwidth.
In the following, we first discuss two possible solutions, and then propose
our main scheme based on a concept of super nodes.
3.2.1 Epidemic Routing Based Scheme
The first possible solution makes use of the epidemic routing idea [58] that is
discussed in Section 2.2.1. This solution assumes no knowledge of user location
or availability. It is a distributed routing approach that delivers messages using
a flood-like technique. To better understand the solution, consider a simple
scenario. As shown in Figure 3.1, if a node, A, wishes to send a message to
another node, B, according to the epidemic routing, node A should forward
the message to all the nodes it encounters. These nodes continue to forward
the message to other nodes, and the procedure continues until the message
reaches the destination node or expires. In our system model, the situation
can be simplified: Node A first forwards the message to the DTN gateway
of its current access network, then the gateway forwards the message to all
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the connected gateways using the Internet backbone, and finally each gateway
forwards the message within its own network.
This technique does not have to manage the user location for successful mes-
sage delivery as it simply uses flooding for message delivery. If the destination
user is unavailable, the messages are stored in the intermediate nodes across
the networks. When the destination user becomes available, the message will
be delivered only when a contact occurs between the destination and one of the
message carriers.
The main advantage of this technique is that it removes the necessity to
manage user location, but it has other drawbacks. The main problem with this
approach is that, for a large network size, the number of forwarded messages
required to deliver one message increases with an increased number of nodes
in the network. The message flooding in the network results in increasing the
number of lost messages (as to be discussed in Section 3.3). Another problem
is the uncertainty of message delivery upon user reconnection, that happens if
the user does not come in contact with any of message holders. The message
holders may also decide to remove the message due to their limited buffer space
before a contact with the destination takes place. As discussed in Section 2.2.1,
the hub count can be defined as the number of times that the message is allowed
to be forwarded. For this approach, it is crucial to determine a suitable hub
count value that achieves the required message delivery rate without exhaust-
ing network resources with the unnecessary circulation of forwarded messages.
The hub count value should be large enough to guarantee a successful message
delivery, which is difficult to achieve for large-size networks.
26
3.2.2 Centralized Node Scheme
The second possible solution is a centralized routing approach. A server resides
on the Internet (as shown in Figure 3.1), and it is able to communicate with
all the gateways. Every node upon connecting to the system must inform the
server of its current location. When a node wants to send a message, it first
contacts the server to find out where the destination node is located, and then
tries to establish a direct connection with the destination node. If the path
setup fails or the connection drops at any time, all the messages are sent to and
stored at the server for retrieval from the destination node upon reconnecting.
Users have to inform the server about their current locations upon connect-
ing. The server can easily locate any user if that user is connected. The main
advantage for this technique, over the epidemic based technique, is that it gives
the sender and the receiver the option to establish a direct connection. This is
important as there may exist an end-to-end path between the communicating
nodes. For example, if the sender is connected through a cellular network and
the receiver is connected through another cellular network or even a WLAN, a
physical end-to-end path can be established in this case. Establishing a physi-
cal end-to-end path will reduce the delay resulting from communicating through
the server as an intermediate node. The server role in this case is to locate the
destination. The importance of the server becomes clear if the destination user
is disconnected or the end-to-end path is unavailable. For example, if the sender
is connected through a cellular network and the receiver is connected through a
sparse mobile ad-hoc network. The messages must go through the server when
the destination is not reachable. The server stores the messages and forwards
them to the destination when it is connected.
The main problem with this solution is scalability. The server becomes a
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bottleneck in the system even for small-size networks. For large-size networks,
this solution is not practical at all.
3.2.3 New Architecture with Super Nodes
Our proposed solution is to combine the preceding two approaches to overcome
their limitations. Instead of having a single server, a number of servers at fixed
locations, referred to as super nodes, are used. They are connected over the
Internet (not through access networks) and they have fixed IDs. Each super
node is responsible for a set of subscribers (i.e., users). Each user (i.e., mobile
node) has a unique and fixed super node, independent of its location changes.
The communication between a super node and a DTN gateway is assumed to be
reliable over the Internet. In fact, a super node can also act as a DTN gateway;
in this case, the super node is responsible for message delivery over the wireless
access networks for which it acts as a DTN gateway.
To send a message, the source node first locates the super node of the desti-
nation node based on user ID hashing. The hashing of user ID can be obtained
based on a predefined hash function that should be globally known to all nodes
in the system. This hash function is a mapping function, which maps user ID
to a super node ID. It should not be confused with cryptographic hash func-
tions. There are several approaches for defining this function and assigning the
user ID. One approach is to append the user ID to the super node ID. In this
case the hash function extracts the bytes that represent the super node address.
For example, assuming 6 bytes ID of a user as 20.30.40.50.10.5, if we assume a
maximum number of super nodes of 216, and the maximum number of users per
super node is 232, we assign the first 2 bytes to represent the super node address
and the remaining 4 bytes to represents the node ID within this super node.
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The hashing of the user ID, in this case, will result in the ID of the super node
as 20.30. Another possible approach is to use a distributed hash table system
such as CAN [78]. The selection of an addressing scheme and a proper hashing
(i.e., mapping) function is based on the actual system constraints such as the
number of nodes and the number of super nodes in the system.
Each mobile node should contact its super node to update its location upon
connecting to an access network. With the latest location of the destination
node provided by its super node, the source node tries to establish a physical
end-to-end connection with the destination. As discussed earlier (in the single
server case), this physical end-to-end connection speeds up the communication
and relaxes the load over the super node. If the connection setup fails or the
connection drops at any time, all the messages are sent to and stored at the des-
tination super node for forwarding to the destination node upon its availability.
The super node may choose to temporarily transfer its custody of a specific
user to another super node. This super node is called custodian super node. It
becomes responsible of that user communication during the custody period. In
the case of custody transfer, the main super node forwards requests for the user
to the new custodian super node. In our system, the custody transfer can occur
for two reasons.
1. Load balancing: The load imposed on super nodes can be regarded as
the messages received and stored for all the users. These messages impose
two types of load: One is storage space load to store these messages
during the user unavailability; The other is communication load imposed
to deliver these messages to their destinations. The load imposed by each
user depends on factors such as the user availability, and the expected
volume of messages for the user. Due to differences of the imposed loads
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over different super nodes, some super nodes may become overloaded while
others may be underloaded. The custody transfer in this case can achieve
load balancing among the super nodes in order to efficiently utilize the
available resources.
2. Reducing communication cost: The home super node may decide to trans-
fer the user custody to another super node that has lower communication
cost with the current user access network. For example, assume the main
super node for a user resides in Canada, and the user takes a vacation at
Paris. If the user messages are sent to the main super node in Canada, the
messages need to travel all the way to a gateway in Paris to be delivered
to the user. It should be more efficient if the main super node temporarily
transfers the custody of user messages to another super node in France for
the period of user roaming there. That is, instead of receiving messages
for the user and then sending them to France, the main super node will
redirect all message senders to the custodian super node.
To better illustrate the super node approach, consider a simple scenario as
shown in Figure 3.2. Node A wants to send a message to node B. By hashing
the ID of node B, it locates the super node SB of node B. Node A sends
to SB a query about node B’s location. Super node SB sends to node A a
message that contains the last known location and the custodian super node
(the current super node on custody of node B messages) of node B. Then,
node A tries to establish a direct connection to node B, that may be possible in
some cases (e.g., if node B is connected through a WLAN or a cellular network)
or may be infeasible (e.g., if node B is connected through a sparse mobile ad-hoc
network with an intermittent link). Suppose that node B is connected through
the wireless mobile ad-hoc network and its current custodian super node is SD.
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Figure 3.2: The proposed network architecture with super nodes
Node A first tries to establish a connection with node B directly, but fails; then
node A sends the messages to super node SD. It is SD’s responsibility to deliver
the messages to node B over the access network. If node B is disconnected from
an access network in custody by super node SD, then SD will send the stored
messages back to node B’s permanent super node SB. Afterward, super node SB
updates its record, declares itself the current custodian super node for B. When
node B informs SB of its current network upon its reconnection, super node SB
will transfer the stored messages and custody to the new custodian super node
of node B based on node B’s current access network. Due to an expected
intermittent connection between node B and its current access network, there
may be bounced messages due to the custody transfer. To prevent message
bouncing, the custodian super node does not transfer the custody until a timeout
period that depends on the access network nature and the load on that custodian
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super node. If the custody is not transferred and SB finds that B is connected
via an access network not in jurisdiction of the current custodian super node,
the permanent super node SB will inform the current custodian to transfer the
custody to the new custodian (i.e. the super node in custody of the new access
network).
It should be noted that the number of super nodes in the system is not
dependent on the number of the access networks (unless a super node also
functions as the gateway of the access network). The number of the super nodes
should be a function of the number of the users in the system. This function
can be defined based on the cost induced of assigning a specific node to a super
node. This cost is defined as the sum of the buffer space cost required to buffer
messages for the node, and the communication cost to deliver the messages from
the super node to the node (e.g., the communication path can involve multiple
carriers with different network charges). The number of super nodes should
be chosen to minimize the cost while making efficient utilization of the super
node resources (i.e., communication bandwidth and buffer space). This topic
needs further research as it is considered a part of the problem of achieving
load balance ( discussed in Section 7.2 ). In this thesis, we consider the cost of
assigning a node to a super node is the same for all the nodes and all the super
nodes. As a result, the number of super node is a function of the number of
nodes and each super node can take up to a maximum number of nodes assigned
statically. The centralized node scheme can be regarded as a special case of the
super node scheme that suits a very small number of users.
The super node system reliability is defined as the system ability to deliver
a message even if its destination is not available, given that the destination can




We use a discrete event simulator written in visual C sharp and MATLAB. The
simulation proceeds for a specified number of simulation steps determined by
the simulation duration parameter. A summary of all the simulation parame-
ters is given in Table 3.1. The simulation scripts are tested using scenarios with
pre-calculated results. Each simulation experiment is repeated for 10 indepen-
dent runs. The variation in simulation results among these simulation runs was
not statistically significant. At the end of the simulation runs, all the log files
are processed by a MATLAB script and the results averaged over the 10 runs
are plotted on graphs. Each simulation experiment is repeated under the differ-
ent message delivery schemes (i.e., super node scheme and the epidemic based
scheme) and the results are compared. Further simulation details are given in
Appendix B.
3.3.2 Simulation Results
We compare the performance of routing based on the super node architecture
with the epidemic routing based scheme. The performance is measured in terms
of the number of exchanged messages over the network to capture how efficiently
each scheme uses the available resources such as radio bandwidth, and the
number of undelivered messages to indicate how successful the scheme is in
delivering messages.
In our experiments, the system has 4 super nodes, 5 wireless access networks
(i.e., 3 sparse mobile ad-hoc networks, 1 WLAN, and 1 cellular network) each
connected via its own gateway to the Internet backbone, and 50 − 100 mobile
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Table 3.1: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Simulation duration 3000 steps
Node buffer 20 Messages
Number of nodes 50− 100
Probability to connect to the previous network
upon reconnection 0.7
Probability to connect to a different network
upon reconnection 0.3
Gateway buffer space 2000 messages
Super node buffer space 2000 messages
Time to collect statistics 100 steps
Message TTL 4 steps
Number of partitions for MANET 100
Number of message transfers per simulation step 40
Network mean residence time 10 steps
Mean disconnection time 10 steps
Number of super nodes 4
Number of gateways 5
Number of WLANs 1
Number of cellular networks 1
Node speed 1 partition/step
Number of MANETs 3
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nodes distributed randomly within the access networks. Each super node is
assigned an equal number of users. A user can roam over all the access networks,
the residence time over each network being an exponentially distributed random
variable with mean of 10 simulation steps. Each user is disconnected for a
random period of time (which is an exponential random variable with mean
of 10 simulation steps), then reconnected either from the same access network
(with probability 0.7) or from any other access network equally likely. All the
messages are equal in size, with the same message time to live (TTL) of 4
simulation steps. The buffer space is 20 messages at each mobile node and 2000
messages at each super node and each gateway.
For simplicity in simulation, we use the epidemic routing over mobile ad-hoc
networks. For each experiment, a communication scenario (i.e., set of mes-
sages, user movements, user disconnections and reconnections events) is set up
randomly and run for each scheme.
Figure 3.3 shows the total number of message exchanges for networks with 50
and 100 mobile nodes respectively. It is clear that the super nodes scheme out-
performs the epidemic routing based scheme, requiring a much smaller overhead
for message exchanges for successful message transfer. Unlike the epidemic rout-
ing based scheme, the super nodes scheme does not need to send the messages
over all the networks, but only to the current access network of the destination
node. It is noted that the performance improvement of using the super nodes
scheme, in terms of the number of exchanged messages and the number of lost
messages, increases when the network size increases (represented by the num-
ber of mobile nodes here). On the other hand, the super nodes scheme still
requires many message exchanges. This is because the majority of the access
networks, in our simulation, are mobile ad-hoc networks, and message delivery
over mobile ad-hoc network requires the exchange of many messages when us-
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Figure 3.3: The total number of exchanged messages.
ing the epidemic routing within each ad-hoc network. We address this problem
with a novel routing approach, introduced in Chapter 4, that reduces the re-
quired number of message exchanges while maintaining acceptable performance
in terms of the number of undelivered messages.
Figure 3.4 shows the number of undelivered messages. It is observed that the
super nodes scheme gives much better performance in terms of the number of
undelivered messages when compared with the epidemic routing based scheme.
The main problem with the epidemic routing based scheme is that every message
is forwarded to all possible intermediate mobile nodes which some of them may
never meet the destination node. With the increasing number of messages,
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Figure 3.4: The number of undelivered messages.
intermediate nodes may have to drop some carried messages due to the buffer
space limitation, resulting in undelivered messages. It is obvious from the figure
that the number of undelivered messages is affected by the number of the mobile
nodes in the system. This is mainly because increasing the number of nodes
results in increasing the number of circulating messages. On the other hand,
for the super nodes scheme, the messages are kept at the super node buffer
until the destination nodes are reconnected. Hence, message loss is mainly
due to the message time to live (TTL) (i.e., the message expired before its
destination node is located over the network). Increasing the message time to
live (TTL) decreases the number of the undelivered messages, but also increases
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the required buffer space at the super nodes. The change of the network size
(as the number of mobile nodes is increased from 50 to 100) slightly increases
the number of undelivered messages, because it mainly depends on the super
node buffer size but not the buffer size at each mobile node.
3.4 Some Related Work
There exist related schemes to handle communications with roaming users, such
as in the terminodes project [79], yet they do not handle the potential intermit-
tent connections of the users. The terminodes project is proposed to construct
a huge self-organized network of mobile nodes. It is assumed that, with a large
number of nodes, the node density is high. As a result, an end-to-end path is
likely to exist between two communicating nodes. However, the super node ar-
chitecture is concerned with the interconnection of heterogeneous wireless access
networks to provide a virtually continuous connection for a roaming user over
the networks (e.g., cellular networks, MANETs, and WLANs). For MANETs
within the super node system, it is assumed that the networks can be sparse so
that an end-to-end path between nodes within the network is unlikely. Commu-
nications in terminodes are based on assigning each node with a virtual home
region (VHR). Each node should determine its geographical location and send
this information back to all the nodes within its VHR. Any node wishing to
communicate with this node should determine its location by contacting any
node within its VHR and then forward its messages to this location. However,
applying the technique to solve the problem under study in our research raises
many issues: First, without availability of the destination node, the communi-
cation will not take place and/or the messages will be lost; Second, with the
potential unreliability of the participating nodes, the node location information
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is not guaranteed to be stored reliably within the VHR; Third, due to the po-
tential unreliable communication between nodes within the VHR, the location
information stored within the nodes in VHR may be inconsistent; Finally, the
VHR may happen to be empty of nodes at any time, which prevents the com-
munication with all the associated nodes to be located. On the other hand, the
super node architecture solves these issues by replacing the VHR with a reliable
super node residing in the Internet, which acts as a communication delegate for
the node, so that even with unavailability of the node itself the message delivery
to the super node can still take place.
The super node architecture can be regarded as an adaptation of the super
node concept in peer-to-peer networks (where a super node plays a special
network role for regular peers [80]) to the DTN domain. There is much similarity
between the peer-to-peer systems with the DTN in general such as using peer-
to-peer reputation systems [81–84] for coping with node cooperation over the
network [85–87]. However, DTNs address problems and system constraints that
are different from that of peer-to-peer systems, where peer-to-peer systems can
be generally regarded from the application layer perspective [88, 89].
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we present the system model and our research problem of how
to achieve connectivity to roaming users with intermittent connections over het-
erogeneous terrestrial wireless access networks. Based on the store-and-forward
strategy used in DTNs, we discuss three possible solutions to the problem. The
main solution is based on the idea of using super nodes as roaming node del-
egates. We discussed various aspects of the proposed techniques such as node
addressing. We conducted a simulation study to evaluate the performance of
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the super nodes scheme and the epidemic routing based scheme. The simula-
tion demonstrates that the super nodes based solution outperforms the epidemic
based solution, especially for large networks, in terms of message exchange over-
head and the number of lost messages.
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Chapter 4
Reliable Message Routing in
MANETs
Message delivery process over the super nodes system can be regarded as a
consecutive number of phases. An end user sends a message that is routed over
the user’s current access network to the network gateway. The gateway forwards
the message to the destination user’s super node over the Internet backbone.
The super node then forwards the message to the gateway of the destination
user’s access network based on the user current location. Finally, the gateway
routes the message over the network to its destination. As a result, routing over
the proposed super node system can be regarded on two levels. The first level is
routing among gateways and super nodes. The second level is routing between
the end user and the network gateway over the user’s current access network.
Based on the super nodes system model, communication among super nodes
and gateways is assumed to be reliable over the Internet backbone. The super
nodes and gateways are assumed to have fixed network locations over the Inter-
net. As a result, message routing among super nodes and gateways can base on
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the regular Internet routing. On the other hand, user roaming and intermittent
connection impose many challenges for reliable message routing over wireless
access networks. No routing technique can be generalized for all the wireless
access networks as each network faces different challenges based on its type.
Wireless access networks can be regarded within two general categories, infras-
tructure based networks and infrastructure-less networks. For infrastructure
based networks (e.g., cellular networks, and WLANs), current regular routing
techniques can be applied with minor modifications to deliver a message when
the destination user is available. For example, in cellular networks, successful
message delivery can be achieved by forwarding the message to the base sta-
tion through which the destination user is currently connected. On the other
hand, routing becomes more complicated for infrastructure-less networks (e.g.,
MANETs), due to the potential unavailability of a physical end-to-end path
between the gateway and the destination user over such type of networks.
Our research focus is how to cope with routing challenges over infrastructure-
less networks in general and on MANETs in particular. MANETs are considered
an essential component of wireless access networks in the super nodes system.
They can provide service coverage over areas where there is no network infras-
tructure to provide communication services. Integrating MANETs as part of
the super nodes system introduces many challenges such as preventing unau-
thorized use of the networks and achieving end-to-end message security that
are studied in Chapter 6. One main challenge is how to route a message over a
MANET. We present a new routing technique [5, 6] for challenged mobile ad-
hoc networks based on the store and forward mechanism employed by the DTN
system architecture. Our contributions are three-fold: (i) We introduce a con-
cept of virtual network topology, which is a redefinition of the network topology
concept to match the DTN context; (ii) we propose a new approach based on
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contact time duration for calculating the probability of future contacts in DTN
networks; (iii) we present a new routing technique that is based on calculating
a dominating set for the virtual network topology, using a new algorithm for
dominating set calculations.
4.1 The MANET System Model
The system model for the MANET under consideration is regarded as a part
of the super nodes system. Here, we consider a MANET as an access network
that provides connection to roaming users over the super nodes system. The
network coverage is limited by a geographical area. In the area resides a DTN
gateway which connects the access network (i.e., MANET) to the super nodes
system using the Internet backbone. Within the MANET, there are a number of
mobile nodes that can freely roam over the network coverage area. These nodes
may have different communication capabilities in terms of wireless transmission
range, memory size, and available transmission power. The nodes are free to
enter or leave the area and consequently join or leave the network. A node can
be unreliable because it can switch off at any time with or without a warning.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a schematic diagram for the MANET model. The
DTN gateway provides connectivity through the Internet backbone. Nodes are
roaming freely over the area covered by the network. The nodes are free to enter
the area covered by the network such as node E or leave the area such node D.
Two nodes are connected when they are able to communicate with each other
(i.e., when they are within each other’s transmission range). For simplicity, we
assume that all nodes have the same transmission range, and that if a node,
A, can receive a message from node, C, then node C can receive from node A
as well. We are interested in a situation where the mobile nodes are sparsely
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of the MANET under consideration.
located and the network is very likely to be partitioned, such that an end-to-end
path between a pair of communicating nodes is very rare.
The DTN gateway has a fixed location within the geographical area, with
communication functions and capabilities similar to those of an ordinary mobile
node. That is, the gateway is assumed to have a limited transmission range,
and can communicate only with the nodes within its transmission range. The
gateway transmission range covers only a small portion of the MANET geo-
graphical area. On the other hand, the gateway has higher processing power
and larger storage (buffer) space than other roaming nodes. In terms of node
mobility pattern, there is no restriction on node movements (except a reasonable
upper bound on the velocity). An assumption is that some nodes usually roam
toward the gateway, so that the gateway can communicate with the roaming
nodes from time to time. This assumption can be satisfied by carefully choos-
ing the gateway location, depending on the geographical features of the service
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coverage area.
4.1.1 Node Mobility Model
As real life users usually follow specific patterns in their movements, we consider
the following user mobility model.
Figure 4.2: Network partitioning and user movement.
The geographical area covered by the MANET is partitioned to m partitions
as shown in Figure 4.2. When a node is connected to the network, it visits each
of the partitions with a certain probability. The location of a mobile node in
the future is independent of its location in the past, given its current location.
Denote the location state of a mobile node by the partition it resides, and assume
the residence times of all the mobile nodes in each partition are iid exponential
random variables. Then the user mobility model can be characterized by a
one-dimensional Markov chain, with location state space {L1, L2, . . . , Lm}, as
shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Modeling of user movement by a finite-state Markov chain.
The user movement model over the network coverage area is described by
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where PLi,j is the conditional probability that a mobile node will enter partition
Lj given that it is still connected to the network and it leaves its current partition
Li. For any partition Li, we have
∑
j PLi,j = 1. The transition probability
matrix depends on the geographical characteristics of the service area and the
network environment under study.
4.2 Previous Routing over MANET
Integrating MANETs as part of the super node system introduces many chal-
lenges in order to achieve seamless message delivery for roaming users. There
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exist various regular routing techniques, such as AODV [32], DSR [35] and
DSDV [38]. The idea of routing in ad-hoc networks based on calculating the
minimum connected dominating set is introduced in [90]. The main limitation
of the regular MANET routing schemes is the need for an end-to-end path
between the source and the destination, which makes them unsuitable for the
system under consideration.
Research efforts have been devoted to routing in a sparse mobile ad-hoc
network (e.g., [44, 45]), which depends on known routes and movements of
some nodes to deliver messages. Moreover, a moving node may be required to
change its movement trajectory to deliver a message [41]. Some routing schemes
require to collect information from the moving nodes about their destination,
velocity and direction of movement, which requires much computations and
the awareness of destination node locations to find the best moving node(s)
to carry messages. That is, these techniques make routing decisions based on
a pre-known moving schedule of the mobile nodes. Other techniques assume
totally scheduled contacts among nodes [62, 63]. The existing schemes are
not suitable for the MANET of interest where mobile nodes move randomly
(freely) without known schedule. On the other hand, epidemic routing [58]
assumes no knowledge about the network topology. It uses flooding to deliver
messages, each node forwards its received message to all its neighbor nodes. The
message delivery mainly depends on node mobility, taking advantage that one
of the message carriers may meet the message’s destination node. Therefore,
it is inefficient in terms of resources utilization, but sometimes necessary. A
compromise between the two extremes is routing based on prediction of the
future movement of a node using the knowledge of its previous location and
movement pattern [42, 65]. The previous work predicts future contacts based
on the number of previous contacts, which suffers from some deficiency that
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will be discussed Section 4.4. To overcome the inadequacy, we propose here a
time-based method for estimating the probability of future contacts.
4.3 Virtual Network Topology for MANET
To route a message is to find a path from the traffic source to send this message
to its destination. For the challenged network scenario that we are interested in,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to find such a path. MANET routing algorithms
depend mainly on constructing the network topology and then processing this
topology to find a path (or paths). These algorithms require that each node
has a full or partial knowledge of the network topology. Constructing and
maintaining this kind of topology in our case means unnecessary overhead as
the network is expected to be sparse most of the time. Furthermore, these
algorithms fail if there is no end-to-end path between the source and destination
nodes, which can happen with a high probability.
Our approach to address the routing issue is to construct a virtual network
topology, where a link between two mobile nodes represents the probability
of future contacts (i.e., meetings) between the two nodes within the network,
instead of representing the existing physical connection between the nodes. A
contact is defined as an opportunity of transmitting and receiving data between
two nodes as they fall within each other’s transmission range.
As shown in Figure 4.4, a simple network is represented as an undirected
graph G = (V,E), where V represents the set of mobile nodes currently par-
ticipating in the network and E represents the set of contact probabilities for
all node pairs. Note that Figure 4.4 illustrates only the links having a nonzero
probability of future contacts.
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Figure 4.4: A simple example of virtual network topology.
4.4 Probability of Future Contacts
The main challenge in developing an efficient routing algorithm for the MANET,
under consideration, is how to construct the virtual network topology, i.e., how to
calculate the probability of future contacts between a pair of nodes. Techniques
proposed for DTN routing use different criteria for predicting future contacts,
e.g., the idea that a most recently met node is more probably to be met [65].
Some techniques assume that each user has a predefined movement pattern that
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rarely changes and the routing decisions are based on these patterns [67]. Other
techniques assume that the future events in the network are known in advance,
which is unreasonable for our system where mobile users roam freely anytime
and anywhere.
There is no general solution to the problem; however, a proper solution
mainly depends on network constraints. Here, the system under consideration
does not have any knowledge of the future events (e.g., node velocity, node
movement direction, time instants of power on and off). Instead, we make use
of network statistics that are collected and stored on the DTN gateway. The
statistics are collected based on all the user sessions in the access network in
the system, not only the current or most recent session.
Previous techniques [42, 65] predict future contacts based on the number
of previous contacts. Such an approach has two problems: One is multiple
falsely detected contacts, as shown in Figure 4.5, where a node, B, is in the
communication range of a node, A. As node B may switch its power off and
then switch it back on, node A will falsely detect more than one contact with
node B. The same situation can happen when node B exhibits an intermittent
connection with node A, e.g., due a communication barrier between them or
the presence of node B on the edge of node A’s communication range.
The other problem is related to permanent neighbors, as shown in Figure
4.5 where a node, C, and a node, D, move with the same velocity and in
the same direction. One contact between the two nodes would be counted
because no disconnection happens, independent of the long duration that the
contact lasts. On the other hand, both nodes encounter other nodes as they
move, which can result in multiple contacts for these nodes due to on and off
links. A routing decision based on the number of contacts makes node C a less
suitable candidate to carry message for node D than other nodes having a larger
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Figure 4.5: Problems with using the number of contacts as a parameter.
number of contacts, although node C should be an optimal candidate to carry
the messages as it is in continuous contact with D.
To address the problems, we propose routing based on the durations of pre-
vious contacts, instead of the number of previous contacts. Taking the total
duration of all the contacts as the parameter is expected to give a better reflec-
tion of the likelihood that the nodes are in contact with each other. Without
loss of generality, consider two nodes, A and B. At any time, let TAB denote the
total time that node A and B were in contact up to the moment. Regardless of
time synchronization and the time durations that nodes A and B respectively
stayed connected to the network, TAB = TBA. The probability of a future
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where TA and TB are the total time durations that nodes A and B respectively
connected to the network up to the moment of estimation.
The previous techniques do not take into account the actual duration of node
connection to the network. As a result, the probability of contacts decreases
with time if no contact occurs even if one or both of the nodes were not connected
prior to the time of estimation. The assumption that a node is always on and
connected is not practical for our system. On the other hand, Equation (4.2)
captures the actual duration that both nodes are connected to the network.
The probability of contact, PAB decreases as TA and/or TB increases for a given
TAB, which means that either node A and/or node B has been connected to
the network without encountering each other. On the other hand, the time
that both nodes were actually connected to the network simultaneously can be
approximated by the minimum of the durations that the nodes were connected





Each node in the network keeps a list that contains the total duration of the
meetings for each encountered node. The node sends this list to the gateway the
first time it connects to the network. During the node life time in the network,
it sends updates of the list to the gateway by piggyback on regular messages,
or by sending special update messages if no regular messages will be sent.
52
4.5 DTN Dominating-Set Based Routing: Du-
ration based Prediction
Our newly proposed routing scheme [5, 6] is based on calculating a connected
dominating set for the virtual network topology graph. A dominating set of a
graph is defined as the subset of vertices of the graph where every vertex not in
the subset is adjacent to at least one vertex in the subset [90]. In our routing
scheme for the MANET, the formulation of the virtual network topology and
the determination of its dominating set takes place at the gateway. The results
are broadcast to all the mobile nodes in the network via the epidemic routing.
That is, the gateway sends the information to all the nodes it encounters. These
nodes, during their movements, forward the message to all other contacted
nodes. The procedure continues until the information reaches all the mobile
nodes in the network. On the other hand, for routing of a data packet from
the source node to the destination node, the packet is forwarded only to the
nodes in the dominating set, different from the epidemic routing for the message
broadcasting. When a node is to send a message, it either transmits it to a
node in the dominating set or to the destination node itself (if there is a direct
contact).
The epidemic routing based on forwarding the message to all the neighboring
nodes, in anticipation that one of these nodes may meet with the destination
node in the near future as it roams. On the other hand, our proposed technique
counts on forwarding the message to the dominating set members only. The
dominating set represents the set of nodes that have high probability to meet
with all the other nodes in the network; the expected number of forwarded
messages is proportional to the size of the dominating set.
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To determine the dominating set, the technique given in [90] is not suitable
to our virtual network topology. We should take the edge weights (i.e., the
probabilities of future contacts) into consideration, as we may have a fully con-
nected graph where most of the edges have a very low weight. Our procedure for
formulating the dominating set contains two phases. In the first phase, for each
node not already in the set, we add the node that it is most probable to meet to
the dominating set. We process the nodes in ascending order of their ID. The
second phase ensures that the dominating set is connected. The dominating
set connectivity means that nodes within the set are probable to meet. This is
necessary to ensure proper forwarding of a message among the dominating set
members in order to deliver it to its destination. As the gateway connects the
MANET to the overall system, it should always be included in the dominating
set.
Algorithm 4.1 shows the details of our proposed algorithm where DS repre-
sents the dominating-set and NG(i) represents the set of neighbors for node i.
As an example to explain the algorithm, consider the simple virtual network
topology in Figure 4.4. After constructing the virtual network topology based on
the future contact probability information based on previous contact duration,
the procedure to determine the dominating set starts as follows. First, we start
with the DS containing only the gateway node, S. Processing node A adds
node B to the DS. As node B is now an element of DS, it is not processed.
Processing node C adds node D to the DS. Processing node E and node F
would add node D which is already in the DS. Processing node G adds node
E to the DS. Note that node H will not be processed as all its neighbors are
already in the DS. After the first phase, DS = {S, B, D, E}. The second
phase finds that the DS is not connected as step 8 results in two connected
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Algorithm 4.1 Calculating a connected dominating set (DS) based on previous
contact duration
Data: G = (V,E): Virtual network topology connected weighted graph;
V : set of nodes;
E: set of contacts probabilities between node pairs;
Result: DS : set represents the calculated dominating
set;
1: Start with DS contains only the gateway node
2: for all node i ∈ V and i /∈ DS and {NG(i) ∩DS} 6= NG(i) do
3: get max Pij where j ∈ NG(i) and NG(j)\{i} 6= φ
4: if j /∈ DS then
5: add j to DS
6: end if
7: end for
8: Get connected components in DS by recursively connecting each node
i ∈ DS with node j where j ∈ NG(i) and j ∈ DS
9: if step 8 results in more than one connected components then
10: Select 2 components and find shortest path with highest sum of weights
connecting them over the graph G
11: for all node i in the calculated path do
12: if i /∈ DS then
13: Add node i to DS
14: end if
15: end for
16: GOTO step 8
17: end if
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components. The first contains the gateway {S} and the second contains the
nodes {B,D,E}. Searching for a shortest path connecting the two components
with the highest sum of edge weights will result in the path {S,C,D}. As a
result, Node C is added to DS. The final calculated connected dominating set
DS = {S, B, D, E, C}.
The proposed algorithm results in a dominating set such that each node in
the network has a high probability to meet with one or more of the set members.
However, the proposed algorithm does not consider the size of the resultant
dominating set. Reducing the dominating set size will reduce the number of
exchanged messages. Moreover, the construction of the virtual network topology
is based on estimating the probability from previous contact duration statistics.
Chapter 5 presents another way of estimating the probability of contacts and
how to reduce the dominating set size.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
We extend the discrete event simulator described in Section 3.3.1 to simulate the
MANET model under consideration. We further use this extended simulator for
the experiments in this chapter and following chapters to test the performance
of the different proposed approaches. The main change is that we simulate only
one MANET with node movements following the mobility model introduced in
Section 4.1.1. The updated list of simulation parameters is given in Table 4.1.
We compare the system performance under the newly proposed estimation
criterion that uses the previous contact duration with that under the criterion of
using the number of previous contacts. Further, We compare the performance
of the newly proposed dominating-set based routing technique with that of the
epidemic routing. The performance is measured in terms of the number of for-
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Table 4.1: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Simulation duration 3000 steps
Number of nodes 50− 100
Node buffer 15 messages
Probability to move to a new partition 0.7
Probability to disconnect from network 0.3
Gateway buffer space 2000 messages
Time to collect statistics 100 steps
Message TTL 40 steps
Number of partitions for MANET 100
Number of message transfers per simulation step 40
Partition mean residence time 20 steps
Network mean disconnection time 20 steps
Node speed 1 partition/step
Message generation mean 103
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warded messages over the network to capture how efficiently each technique uses
the available resources such as radio bandwidth, and the number of undelivered
messages to indicate how successful the technique is in delivering messages (a
QoS measure).
In our experiments, the MANET coverage area is a square of size 10 × 10
partitions. Each simulation proceeds in discrete time steps. Mobile nodes have
mobility trajectories independent of each other. We experiment with 50 − 100
nodes. For each simulation run, a transition matrix M, given by Equation
(4.1), is randomly generated and stays fixed till the end of the simulation.
Initially, node locations are uniformly distributed over the service area. As the
simulation time increases, each node (if connected) moves randomly according
to the transition matrix. When a node moves to a new partition, it stays there
for a residence time that is an exponential random variable with an average of
20 simulation steps. At the end of the residence time, the node will move to
a new partition with a probability of 0.7, or will disconnect from the network
with a probability of 0.3. If the node disconnects, it will stay disconnected for a
duration that is exponentially distributed with an average of 20 simulation steps.
For simplicity, we assume that a node is able to communicate only with the other
nodes in the same partition. Messages are generated based on a Poisson process
with mean rate of 103 messages per time step. The source and destination
mobile nodes for each message are selected at random. All the messages are
equal in size, with the same message time to live (TTL) of 40 simulation steps.
The buffer space is 15 messages at each mobile node and 2000 messages at the
gateway. When the node buffer is full and a new message is received, the oldest
message in the buffer is removed to receive the new message. At each time
step, the node detects its neighbor nodes and exchanges the buffered messages
with them (the messages they do not already have) based on the used routing
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technique. Each node also update its buffer by removing the expired messages.






























Figure 4.6: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set based
routing with respect to the number of messages exchanged.
For each experiment, a communication scenario (i.e., set of messages, user
connections, user disconnections, user movements) is set up randomly and run
for each routing technique. In these simulation experiments, we create the con-
dition of near permanent contact between node pairs, as discussed in Section
4.4, by fixing the transition matrix for all network nodes. Moreover, we allow
node communications in transitions between partitions and fix the travel path
between partition pairs. This results in some nodes will be in long contacts with
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other nodes while it is still counted as one contact as discussed in Section 4.4.
However, it will be shown in Chapter 5 that even with different mobility matrices
for each node the proposed criterion still achieve better performance compared
to the epidemic routing. The results we discuss in this section is based on es-
timating the probability of future contacts based on previous contact duration
using Equation 4.2. It is found that using Equation 4.2 and Equation 4.3 for
estimating the probability of future contacts based on previous contacts dura-
tion give comparable results and the same conclusions when compared with the
case of using the number of previous contacts as a metric under our simulation
conditions.
Figure 4.6 shows a comparison between the epidemic routing technique and
the dominating set based routing technique in terms of the total number of
forwarded messages. It includes the results for the dominating-set routing tech-
nique based on two different ways of calculating the probability of future con-
tacts. One is based on the number of previous contacts and the other is based
on the total contact time as discussed in Section 4.4. It is clear that the domi-
nating set based technique is much better than the epidemic routing in terms of
the number of forwarded messages, because in the former scheme each message
is forwarded only to the dominating set members, but not all the neighbor-
ing nodes as in the latter scheme. It is also observed from the figure that the
time based calculation for the dominating set gives better performance than the
calculation based on the number of previous contacts.
On the other hand, Figure 4.7 demonstrates that the dominating-set based
routing leads to more undelivered messages than the epidemic routing. A mes-
sage is lost if it has not been delivered to the destination node before the message
time to live (TTL) expires. In the new scheme, a message is forwarded only from
the dominating set members to the destination, which is more likely to cause
60































Figure 4.7: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set based
routing with respect to the number of undelivered messages.
a longer delay for the destination node to meet one of the message carriers as
compared with the epidemic routing. However, when the message time to live
is increased to 80 simulation steps, the two routing schemes give comparable
performance in terms of the number of lost messages as shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.7 also shows that calculating the probability of future contacts
based on the previous contact durations leads to better routing performance (in
terms of the number of undelivered messages) than calculating it based on the
number of previous contacts, as the time based probability calculation results
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in a more accurate virtual network topology.




























DS with message TTL= 40
Epidemic with  message TTL= 40
DS with  message TTL= 80
Epidemic with  message TTL= 80
Figure 4.8: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set based
routing with different TTL values in terms of the number of undelivered mes-
sages.
Figure 4.8 shows how the message time to live (TTL) affects the number of
undelivered messages. Increasing message time to live (TTL) increases message
delivery probability as it is more likely that the destination node meets a member
in the dominating set. On the other hand, increasing the message TTL increases
the number of forwarded messages for both schemes as shown in Figure 4.9,
mainly because of the retransmission of dropped messages due to the limited
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DS with message TTL= 40
Epidemic with message TTL= 40
DS with message TTL= 80
Epidemic message TTL= 80
Figure 4.9: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set based
routing with different TTL values in terms of the number of forwarded messages.
buffer space. It is observed that the dominating set routing scheme outperforms,
in terms of the number of forwarded messages, the epidemic routing scheme for
the different TTL values.
We perform the experiments for different sizes of the network and have the
same observations. As shown in Figure 4.10, when the number of nodes is in-
creased to 100, the dominating set routing outperforms the epidemic routing in
terms of resource utilization (measured by the number of forwarded messages),
and gives comparable performance in terms of the percentage of undelivered
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messages. It is noted that, as the MANET operation time increases, the num-
ber of forwarded messages decreases as more observation data are available for
estimating the probability of future contacts, resulting in a more accurate vir-
tual network topology.

























DS with 50 Nodes
Epidemic with 50 Nodes
DS with 100 Nodes
Epidemic with 100 Nodes
Figure 4.10: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set
based routing with increasing the number of nodes.
Figure 4.11 shows that, as the MANET operation time increases, the dom-
inating set size (i.e., number of nodes) decreases, and a more accurate virtual
network topology can be constructed. The figure also shows how the size of the
dominating set is dependent on the number of nodes in the network. But, re-
64
gardless of the network size, the dominating set size decreases with the MANET
operation time, which also causes the number of forwarded messages to decrease
(as shown in Figure 4.10). As a result, the dominating set routing technique
gives better performance when the MANET operation time increases.



























DS with 50 Nodes
DS with 100 Nodes
Figure 4.11: The dominating set size.
To study the buffer size effect, we increase the message TTL to 80, so that
both schemes have comparable performance in terms of the percentage of un-
delivered messages. As shown in Figure 4.12, the performance of both routing
schemes degrades (in terms of the number of undelivered messages) when the
buffer size is reduced, but the dominating-set based routing still outperforms
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the epidemic routing.




















DS with Buffer Size 15
Epidemic with Buffer Size 15
DS with Buffer Size 5
Epidemic with Buffer Size 5
Figure 4.12: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set
based routing with different buffer sizes in terms of the number of lost mes-
sages.
Figure 4.13 shows that the total number of messages forwarded with a small
buffer size decreases in comparison with the case of a larger buffer size, but not
proportional to the decrease of the buffer size. That is because reducing the
buffer size not only increases the number of undelivered messages (as expected),
but also the number of forwarded messages due to a n increased number of
retransmissions of dropped messages because of the buffer space limitation. The
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DS with Buffer Size 15
Epidemic with Buffer Size 15
DS with Buffer Size 5
Epidemic with Buffer Size 5
Figure 4.13: Comparison between the epidemic routing and dominating-set
based routing with different buffer sizes in terms of the number of exchanged
messages.
performance of both routing schemes degrade when the buffer size is reduced,
but the dominating-set based routing still outperforms the epidemic routing in
terms of the number of exchanged messages.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we consider routing over the super nodes system. We con-
centrate on routing over MANETs as a part of the super nodes system. We
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introduce the concept of virtual network topology to adequately model a DTN
based network with intermittent links. Constructing this topology requires an
estimate of the probability of future contacts between nodes in the network.
We propose to estimate the contact probability for nodes in MANETs based on
the duration of previous contacts. We then propose a new routing technique
based on calculating a connected dominating set of the constructed virtual net-
work topology. Simulation results demonstrate that the newly proposed routing
scheme outperforms the epidemic routing in terms of resources utilization, and
that the estimation of the probability of future contacts between two nodes
based on previous contact durations yields better routing performance than the





Dominating-set based routing for DTNs, introduced in Chapter 4, is based
on the concept of virtual network topology. Unlike regular network topology
where graph links represent physical connections among nodes, the virtual net-
work topology defines a link between two mobile nodes as the probability of
future contacts (i.e., meetings) between the two nodes within the network. The
routing technique is based on finding a connected dominating-set for the vir-
tual network topology graph. The more accurate the virtual graph, the better
the performance of the routing technique. The accuracy of the virtual network
topology is mainly based on how accurate the probability of a contact between
each pair of nodes can be estimated. In this chapter, we investigate how to
exploit node mobility model to better estimate the probability of a contact
between nodes.
Our contributions [1, 2] are four-fold: (i) we derive a node inter-meeting time
distribution based on the proposed node mobility model and demonstrate the
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accuracy of the distribution by a simulation study; (ii) we investigate how the
proposed estimation of the contact probability can improve the performance
of the dominating-set based routing scheme; (iii) we study how to relax the
constraints of selecting the dominating-set members in order to achieve bet-
ter resource utilization with acceptable performance by reducing the selected
dominating set size; and (iv) we propose an alternative routing scheme based
on selecting a random set and investigate how efficient the scheme is compared
with the dominating set routing technique.
5.1 Estimation of the Contact Probability
As in real life, users usually have some patterns in their movements, we consider
a Markov chain based user mobility model presented in Section 4.1.1. Similar
models are also adapted in subsequent work by other researchers, such as in [91].
In this mobility model, the geographical service area of the MANET is parti-
tioned to m partitions. A node-to-node direct communication takes place among
nodes within the same partition. Node future location is independent of its past
location, given its current location. The residence time of a node in a partition
in each visit is an exponential random variable with parameter λ. For simplicity,
we assume this parameter is the same for all the nodes and network partitions.
Denote the location state of a mobile node by its current partition. Then, the
user mobility model can be characterized by a one-dimensional continuous-time
Markov chain where the node movement is described by the transition matrix
M, given by Equation (4.1).
Our goal is to analyze the node mobility model to get an accurate estimate
for the probability of contact. We focus on the inter-meeting time between two
nodes. Define inter-meeting time between a pair of nodes as the duration from
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the instant that the two nodes move out of each other’s transmission range to
the instant that the two nodes move within each other’s transmission range the
next time. Define node inter-arrival time for a partition as the duration from
the instant that the node departs from the partition to the instant that the
node arrives at the partition the next time.
In the following, we first study the distribution of the node inter-arrival time
for a partition, and then the distribution of the inter-meeting time.
Theorem 5.1. The inter-arrival time of a node, A, to a partition, i, is an ex-
ponential random variable with mean 1
λπAi
, where πAi is the limiting probability
that node A resides in partition i.
Proof. The continuous-time Markov chain for node A is irreducible. Hence, the




PLj,iπAj , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (5.1)
∑
i
πAi = 1. (5.2)
The probability πAi is the fraction of time that node A resides in partition i.
Define N(t) as the number of all visited partitions by time t for node A. Then
N(t) is a Poisson process with mean λt (see Appendix A). Define Ni(t) as the
number of visits of node A to partition i by time t. Then Ni(t) is a Poisson
process with parameter λπAit. As a result, the inter-arrival time of node A to




Theorem 5.2. The inter-meeting time between a node, A, and another node,





Proof. Nodes A and B meeting at partition i can occur in two scenarios: (i)
Node A moves to partition i while node B already resides in partition i; and (ii)
node B moves to partition i while node A already resides in partition i. Con-
sider scenario (i), the number of meetings between the two nodes at partition i
is the fraction of node A arrivals to partition i while node B is residing there.
From Theorem 5.1 and noting that node B resides in partition i with proba-
bility πBi , the number of meetings between node A and node B at partition i
when node A makes the movement is a Poisson process with mean λπAiπBit.
Hence, the inter-meeting time between node A and node B at partition i when
node A makes the movement is an exponential random variable with parameter
λπAiπBi . Similarly, for scenario (ii), the inter-meeting time between node A
and node B at partition i when node B makes the movement is an exponential
random variable with parameter λπBiπAi . As a result, the inter-meeting time
between node A and node B at partition i is a random variable that is the
minimum of the two independent exponential random variables, which follows
an exponential distribution with parameter (λπAiπBi + λπBiπAi). Considering
all network partitions, the inter-meeting time between node A and node B is a
random variable that has a distribution of the minimum of the the two nodes
inter-meeting times at all the network partitions, which is an exponential ran-
dom variable with parameter
∑m
i=1 2λπAiπBi .
Consider two nodes, A and B. Let P TAB denote the probability that a contact
occurs between A and B, given that both of them are connected to the network
over a time duration T . The probability of a contact based on the inter-meeting
time between the nodes is
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P TAB = 1− e
−
∑m
i=1 2λπAiπBiT . (5.3)
In this chapter we analyze the proposed mobility model. Most previous
research works in DTNs employed the random way mobility model which is
found to be too simple to characterize real life user roaming over different wire-
less network coverage areas. Many research efforts have been devoted to this
area [92, 93]. There is no general mobility model for DTNs, however many
research works that used real user traces such as [94, 95] and/or different node
mobility models such as [96] have reached conclusions, similar to our analysis,
that the node inter-meeting time can be approximately described by an ex-
ponential distribution. Moreover, we assume independent node inter-meeting
times, which is an assumption adapted in many research works in the field of
DTN such as the work in [97]. Similarly, the research work that is based on the
analysis of real user traces such as the work in [94, 95] has reached the same
conclusions as those assuming independence inter-meeting times.
5.2 Updated Dominating-set Routing
To apply the mobility model analysis to the dominating-set routing scheme,
we use the expected inter-meeting time as a measure of link existence, which
provides an estimation of how frequently two nodes will meet in the future. As
a result, we can establish a virtual network topology as an undirected graph
Ĝ = (V, Ê), where V represents the set of mobile nodes currently connected
to the network and Ê is the set containing the expected inter-meeting times
between any two nodes. Algorithm 5.1 is a modified version of the dominating-
set selection algorithm (Algorithm 4.1), where τij is the inter-meeting time
between node i and node j, and NG(i) is the set of neighbours for node i.
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Algorithm 5.1 Calculating a connected dominating-set (DS) based on node
inter-meeting times
Data: G = (V, Ê): Virtual network topology connected weighted graph;
V : set of nodes;
Ê:set containing the expected inter-meeting times, τij, between each node pair
(i, j);
Result: DS : set represents the calculated dominating
set;
1: Start with DS contains only the gateway node
2: for all node i ∈ V and i /∈ DS and {NG(i) ∩DS} 6= NG(i) do
3: get min E[τij] where j ∈ NG(i) and NG(j)\{i} 6= φ
4: if j /∈ DS then
5: add j to DS
6: end if
7: end for
8: Get connected components in DS by recursively connecting each node
i ∈ DS with node j where j ∈ NG(i) and j ∈ DS
9: if step 8 results in more than one connected components then
10: Select 2 components and find shortest path with lowest sum of weights
connecting them over the graph G
11: for all node i in the calculated path do
12: if i /∈ DS then
13: Add node i to DS
14: end if
15: end for
16: GOTO step 8
17: end if
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5.3 Dominating-set Selection Constraints Re-
laxation
Increasing the dominating-set size (i.e., number of nodes in the set) improves
the probability of message delivery by reducing the number of lost (i.e., unde-
livered) messages, at the cost of increasing the number of message forwarded.
The extreme case is that the dominating-set includes all the nodes in the net-
work, which corresponds to the epidemic routing. Selecting dominating-set
members based on the greedy Algorithm 5.1 does not take into consideration
the dominating-set size, as each node selects the node with minimum expected
inter-meeting time. The computation of the minimum connected dominating set
over a given graph is an NP-complete problem [98], so approximate techniques
are necessary for practical calculations. There has been a number of approxi-
mate techniques to calculate a dominating set for a network [99]. However, for
the problem under consideration, the edge weight must be taken into consider-
ation in selecting the domination set. In the following, we study the problem
of reducing the dominating-set size and propose an alternative dominating-set
selection algorithm. The new algorithm improves the routing performance in
terms of resource utilization, while achieving acceptable performance in terms
of the number of lost messages.
Message delivery in the system under consideration takes place when a
message carrier comes into contact with the message destination. For the
dominating-set based routing, the message carrier can be either a dominating-set
member or the message source itself (i.e., in a case of direct contact). Assuming
a sufficiently large node buffer space, message loss mainly occurs as a result of
the message expiry before a contact between a carrier and the message desti-
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nation takes place. In a regular network, the end-to-end message delay can be
controlled by selecting the message route to enforce certain quality of service.
On the other hand, in a delay tolerant network environment, it is so difficult to
precisely estimate the end-to-end delay of delivering a message. Most research
efforts in this problem try to give an estimation for the delay over a specific
route. In [100], it is stated that finding all the routes from a given source to
a given destination with exact calculation of the expected delay distribution is
a NP-hard problem, where the delay calculation is based on the primary path
that has the smallest expected delay. To apply this to the dominating-set se-
lection problem, it requires to calculate the shortest path between nodes for
every source and destination. Based on the calculated shortest paths for all the
nodes, the optimal dominating-set can be selected. Considering network size
and dynamics (i.e., expected change in network memberships due to user roam-
ing, disconnection, and power failure), the calculations will be very complicated
and impractical.
As shown in Figure 5.1 where the dominating-set has N nodes, the mes-
sage end-to-end delay, denoted by TD, for a no-direct contact case under the
dominating-set routing consists of three delay components: the delay τS for the
message source to deliver the message to the dominating-set, the delay τDS for
the message over the dominating-set, and the delay τD to deliver the message
from the dominating-set to the destination node. The expected end-to-end delay
can be expressed as
E[TD] = E[τS] + E[τDS] + E[τD]. (5.4)
The delay over the dominating-set, τDS, can range from 0 in the case of two hop
path delivery to
∑N−1
i=1 τi,i+1. Note that τi,j is a random variable that represents
the time for node i to meet node j. As we assume no control on node mobility,
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the only way to reduce these delay components is by selecting more nodes in the
dominating-set. However, that will increase the number of forwarded messages,
which causes inefficient use of the system resources. Minimizing the size of
the dominating set improves the system performance in terms of the number
of forwarded messages, however it increases the number of lost messages as
it increases the expected delivery time. As a tradeoff solution, we propose
to change the dominating-set selection criterion from selecting the nodes most
likely to meet with each node in the network to selecting a minimum set of
nodes so that every node in the network is expected to meet with a member of
the set within a time interval less than certain threshold value θt on average.
Figure 5.1: End-to-end message delivery under dominating-set based routing.
Based on Theorem 5.2, the inter-meeting time between a node, A, and any
other node, X, that is a member of the dominating-set is an exponential random





for the network coverage with m partitions.
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As a result, the inter-meeting time between node A and the dominating-set
(excluding A if A is a DS member) is the minimum of the inter-meeting times






Using Equation (5.4), reducing the expected end-to-end delay can be achieved
by reducing the individual delay components, thus by reducing the expected
inter-meeting time between an individual node and the dominating-set. The
newly proposed algorithm, given in Algorithm 5.2, selects dominating-set mem-
bers by including a small set of nodes so that every node in the network
has an expected inter-meeting time with the set less than θt. The algorithm
starts with a set, DS, containing only the gateway node. A node, A, will be
added to DS only if there exists a node B where E[τB] ≥ θt and E[τAB] =
min(E[τXB]), ∀X ∈ NG(B), where τAB is the inter-meeting time between A
and B, τB is the inter-meeting time between node B and DS, and NG(B) is the
set of neighbours for node B. As a result, increasing θt is expected to reduce
the DS size.
Unlike Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 5.1, processing a node, A, will result in
adding its most probable node to meet, B, to the DS, only if the expected time
of node A to meet with a dominating set member does not satisfy the required
criterion θt. For sufficiently large θt, the dominating set may contain only the
gateway, which is similar to the case of direct transmissions. As a result, the
newly proposed algorithm, Algorithm 5.2, is expected to improve the system
performance in terms of the number of forwarded messages as it can result in a
reduced DS, as discussed next.
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Algorithm 5.2 Calculating a connected dominating-set (DS) based on con-
straints relaxation
Data: G = (V, Ê): Virtual network topology connected weighted graph;
V : set of nodes;
Ê: set containing the expected inter-meeting times, τij, between each node
pair(i, j);
Result: DS : set represents the calculated dominating
set;
1: Start with DS contains only the gateway node







5: if τi < θt then
6: Skip next steps and get next i ∈ V
7: end if
8: get min E[τij] where j ∈ NG(i)
9: if j /∈ DS then




5.4 A Network Example
In this section, we consider an example based on a typical simulation experiment
to show how the different algorithms will process a typical scenario. The network
consists of 7 nodes and the gateway S. This network is a fully connected graph.
For presentation clarity, the topology is represented in a table format, given in
Table 5.1. This table presents the probability of contact for each pair of nodes
in the network based on the processed statistics of the contact duration among
the nodes. For example, node A has a probability of 49% to contact node B,
when both are connected to the network, and a probability of 86% to contact
the gateway S. It is important to note that contacts between any pair of nodes
are disjoint events.
Table 5.1: Probability of contacts based on previous contact duration (percent-
age).
Node ID
S A B C D E F G
S − 86 55 10 75 81 10 41
A 86 − 49 49 57 58 49 43
B 55 49 − 71 56 62 33 38
C 10 49 71 − 49 78 71 84
D 75 57 56 49 − 35 80 25
E 81 58 62 78 35 − 27 91
F 10 49 33 71 80 27 − 37
G 41 43 38 84 25 91 37 −
Applying Algorithm 4.1 over the virtual network topology presented in Table
5.1, the algorithm starts with a set, DS, that contains only the gateway S.
Processing each node in an ascending order of node ID, the most probable node
to meet node A is S which is already in DS. For node B, as the most probable
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node to meet is node C, node C is added to DS. Node C is not processed as it
is already in DS. For node D, node F is the most probable node to meet and
it is added to DS. For node E, the most probable node to meet is node G, so
node G is added to DS. Nodes E and G are skipped from processing as they
are members of the selected set. At the end of the first phase, the dominating
set is DS = {S, C, F , G}. The second phase that guarantees the connectivity
of the set is not necessary in this scenario as the graph is fully connected.
To apply Algorithm 5.1, it is required to calculate the expected inter-meeting
time between each pair of nodes based on their mobility pattern, which is given
in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Inter-meeting time (Simulation step).
Node ID
S A B C D E F G
S − 41 31 180 35 28 91 60
A 41 − 52 49 53 40 60 54
B 31 52 − 46 50 50 60 46
C 180 49 46 − 42 46 46 41
D 35 53 50 42 − 40 33 48
E 28 40 50 46 40 − 50 47
F 91 60 60 46 33 50 − 52
G 60 54 46 41 48 47 52 −
Based on Table 5.2, Algorithm 5.1 starts with a set, DS, that contains only
the gateway S. Processing each node in an ascending order of node ID, the
resulting DS = {S, E, G, F}, which is a connected set.
It should be noticed that Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 5.1 result in different
sets for the same problem as they process virtual network topology constructed
based on different criteria, given in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 respectively.
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Reducing the size of the dominating set is the main design goal for Algorithm
5.2. This algorithm ensures that each node in the network has an expected inter-
meeting time with the selected dominating set members less than a specific
threshold value. If this cannot be achieved, the algorithm adds (to the selected
set) the node with the least expected inter-meeting time (similar to Algorithm
5.1).
For the network scenario, Message TTL = 90 and θt =
Message TTL
2 .
Algorithm 5.2 starts with a set, DS, that contains only the gateway S. For
node A , τA = 41, so node A will not select any more nodes to be in DS as
τA < θt. For node B, τB = 31, similar to node A case, processing node B will not
add any nodes to DS. For node C, τC = 180, so node C selects the node with
the least expected inter-meeting time which is node G to be added to DS. For







= 23.23, so node D will not select







= 17.54, so node E








so node F will not select any more nodes to be in DS. Node G is processed for
the set DS\{G} as G is a dominating set member. As τG = 44 < θt, no more
nodes are added to the set. The selected dominating set will be DS = {S, G}.
Given a reasonable value of θt, the new algorithm should result in a reduced
size dominating set. All the algorithms for determining a dominating set for a
virtual network topology are based on the idea of selecting a set of carrier nodes
that cover the whole graph. It is expected that with a smaller dominating
set size, the routing performance will be improved as the number of forwarded
messages will decrease. With a fully connected network topology, selecting a
random set of nodes can be regarded as an alternative approach. The main
advantages are that there is no need to collect network statistics and to perform
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dominating set selection computation as with the discussed algorithms. This
is expected to reduce the computation overhead related to constructing and
processing the virtual topology and to reduce the network overhead related
to collecting the network statistics from the different nodes. This alternative
approach is evaluated through our experiments in Section 5.5.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
We extend the simulation experiments introduced in Section 4.6 as follows. This
section presents analytical results in comparison with simulation results for the
inter-arrival time and the inter-meeting time. Moreover, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the dominating-set based routing scheme based on the user mobility
model analysis and the newly proposed algorithm that relaxes the selection con-
straints. The performance is compared with that of epidemic routing and of the
dominating-set based routing scheme using Algorithm 4.1. The performance is
measured in terms of (i) the numbers of delivered and lost messages to indicate
how reliable each technique is in delivering messages, and (ii) the number of for-
warded messages over the network to demonstrate how efficiently each technique
uses the available resources (i.e., radio bandwidth and node buffer space).
In the simulation, the number of partitions of the MANET coverage area
varies in range of 10−50. Each simulation proceeds in discrete time steps. Mo-
bile nodes move with mobility trajectories independent of each other. For each
simulation run, the movement matrix M of each node is generated at random
and stays fixed till the end of the simulation. Initially, the node locations are
uniformly distributed over the service area. As the simulation time increases,
each node moves randomly according to its transition matrix. The node resi-
dence time at each partition is an exponential random variable with an average
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of 10 simulation steps. At the end of the residence time, the node moves to
a new partition based on its mobility matrix. Messages are generated in the
network based on a Poisson process with mean rate of 910 messages per simu-
lation time step, with a constant message size. The source and the destination
for each message are selected at random. The message time to live is constant
with a value of 50 simulation steps. Each mobile node has a buffer space of
15 messages. The gateway has a buffer space of 2000 messages. A buffer over-
flow occurs when a node buffer is full and a new message is received. When a
buffer overflow occurs, the oldest message in the buffer is discarded. Message
exchanges occur among nodes residing in the same partition. We assume that
the traveling time between partitions is small and can be neglected as compared
to the partition residence time. At each time step, the node detects its neighbor
nodes and exchanges the buffered messages with them (the messages they do
not already have) based on the used routing technique. For each experiment, a
communication scenario (i.e., set of messages, user connections, user disconnec-
tions, user movements) is set up randomly and run for each routing technique.
For simplicity of simulation, we assume that each node can access the medium
reliably.
Our first experiment is to validate the distribution of the inter-arrival time
by simulation. In this experiment, we record node inter-arrival times for differ-
ent partitions in the network. Based on the simulation recorded data, the mean
and the 95% confidence interval are calculated and compared with the theo-
retical mean value obtained by applying Theorem 5.1. It is observed that the
theoretical mean gives a very good approximation to the simulated data mean,
which lies within the calculated 95% confidence interval of the simulation data.
Table 5.3 shows a sample of the simulation results for a node moving over a
network consisting of 10 partitions.
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Table 5.3: Statistics of the node inter-arrival time.
Partition Simulation Analysis
ID Mean Confidence interval Mean
1 62.59 54.10− 71.08 66.25
3 80.54 65.69− 95.39 80.63
4 51.83 44.01− 59.65 56.36
5 59.57 51.11− 68.03 57.04
8 90.64 73.60− 107.68 90.59
9 127.44 99.00− 155.88 120.04
10 126.58 104.35− 148.80 122.12
Our next experiment is to validate the distribution of the node inter-meeting
times by simulation. In this experiment, we track node-to-node inter-meeting
times for each pair of nodes in the network. Table 5.4 shows the simulation
results for tracking 4 nodes over a network of 10 partitions and compares them
with the results calculated based on Theorem 5.2. It is observed that the sim-
ulation and analytical results match well.
Table 5.4: Statistics of the node inter-meeting time.
Node Simulation Analysis
pair Mean Confidence interval Mean
1, 2 59.00 49.82− 68.18 54.83
1, 3 52.97 45.38− 60.55 50.24
1, 4 51.87 44.60− 59.14 49.53
2, 3 48.83 41.80− 55.87 44.77
2, 4 78.63 62.67− 94.59 79.92
3, 4 61.82 50.89− 72.75 62.70
In the following, we study the performance of the dominating-set based
routing scheme using the node inter-meeting time as an indication of node-to-
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node future contact frequency. The results are obtained by simulating a network
with 20 partitions and 70 nodes.























Figure 5.2: Number of delivered messages under different routing schemes.
Figure 5.2 shows a performance comparison in terms of the number of de-
livered messages between the epidemic routing scheme and the dominating-set
based routing scheme using both criteria of (i) the inter-meeting time and (ii)
the time based estimate of the probability of future contacts according to Equa-
tion (4.2). The dominating-set routing technique based on node inter-meeting
times is found to slightly outperforms the other two schemes. This is demon-
strated more clearly in Figure 5.3, which shows a comparison among the three
schemes in terms of the number of undelivered (lost) messages. With the node
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Figure 5.3: Number of lost messages under different routing schemes.
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limited buffer space and an increasing number of exchanged messages, some
messages are lost due to buffer overflow. Using the node inter-meeting times
as a selection criterion ensures that message carriers are more likely to be in
contact with the message destination in a shorter duration.
Figure 5.4 shows a performance comparison in terms of the number of for-
warded messages as a measure for the network resource utilization. It is clear
that the dominating-set routing scheme based on the node inter-meeting times
gives the best performance among the three schemes. This is mainly due to
the accurate selection of the dominating set members that results in a reduced
number of forwarded messages required to achieve message delivery.
On the other hand, experimenting with an increased node buffer size shows
that the three schemes give comparable results in terms of the number of de-
livered messages and the number of lost messages (due to a decrease in buffer
overflow). However, the dominating-set routing scheme based on the node inter-
meeting times consistently gives the best performance in terms of the number
of forwarded messages. Considering the inevitability of having a limited node
buffer space, it is clear that a more intelligent buffer management scheme can
improve the performance of the routing schemes, which is interesting topic for
further research.
We extend our experiments by implementing the newly proposed algorithm
(i.e., Algorithm 5.2) for selecting dominating-set members based on the crite-
rion of limiting the expected node inter-meeting with the dominating-set to a




2 and θ2 =
Message TTL
5 .
Figure 5.5 shows how the new algorithm improves the performance in terms
of the number of forwarded messages as compared to the case of using Algorithm
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Figure 5.4: Number of forwarded messages under different routing schemes.
5.1 and the case of epidemic routing. Increasing the threshold value gives better
results in terms of forwarded messages, but decrease the performance in terms of
the number of lost messages as shown in Figure 5.6. It is noticed that Algorithm
5.2 outperforms Algorithm 5.1 in terms of the number of forwarded messages
with acceptable performance in terms of the number of lost messages. This is
mainly because, under the new criterion, the dominating set size is reduced.
As Figure 5.6 shows, the number of the lost message under Algorithm 5.2
is larger than that under Algorithm 5.1. This is because increasing message
holding time at a carrier node ( i.e., DS member) increases the probability that
the message being discarded before being delivered due to a buffer overflow.
With a larger node buffer space, it is noted that both Algorithms 5.1 and 5.2
give comparable results. This is because message loss in this case is mainly due
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Figure 5.5: Number of forwarded messages under different routing schemes and
different threshold values.
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Figure 5.6: Number of lost messages under different routing schemes and dif-
ferent threshold values.
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to the message expiry, but less likely due to buffer overflow. It is also noted
that, regardless of the buffer space, Algorithm 5.2 outperforms Algorithm 5.1
in terms of the number of forwarded messages. The threshold value θt plays an
important role in the performance based on Algorithm 5.2. How to determine
a proper θt value, for a given network scenario, requires further investigation.





































Figure 5.7: The random selection technique performance compared to the
other techniques in terms of the number of forwarded messages.
Our last experiments investigate the performance of the random set selection
technique (discussed in Section 5.4), in comparison with the other techniques,
as illustrated in Figures 5.7- 5.8. The DS size is set to the smallest DS size from
the discussed algorithms, but the DS members are selected randomly. Figure
5.8 shows that the random selection technique degrades the performance signifi-
cantly even when compared with the worst performance of the other techniques.
In other words, reducing DS size alone does not improve the performance unless
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Figure 5.8: The random selection technique performance compared to the other
techniques in terms of the number of lost messages.
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an accurate selection methodology for the DS members is employed to guaran-
tee proper contacts between the set members and the other nodes. The number
of lost messages increases due to the lack of contacts between the set members
and the other nodes, which causes messages to expire before being delivered.
This decrease in contacts also leads to the smallest number of forwarded mes-
sages (as shown in Figure 5.8) as compared to the other techniques. Reducing
the number of forwarded messages in this case cannot be regarded as a perfor-
mance improvement because of the significant degradation in the performance
in terms of the number of lost messages.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we consider the dominating-set based routing for a DTN based
MANET within the super nodes system. We analyze the node mobility to
better estimate node-to-node future contact statistics for improving message
delivery. The node inter-meeting time distribution is derived based on a Marko-
vian node mobility model, which is validated by a simulation study. The mean
node inter-meeting time is used in the dominating-set routing scheme. Com-
puter simulation results demonstrate that the dominating-set routing scheme
based on the mean node inter-meeting time outperforms epidemic routing and
dominating-set routing based on previous contact duration, in terms of both
message delivery rate and resource utilization. Moreover, we propose a new
algorithm for selecting the dominating-set based on the distribution of node
inter-meeting time, which results in a smaller dominating-set size. The newly
proposed algorithm chooses a set of nodes so that every node in the network
should have an expected inter-meeting time with the set members under a cer-
tain threshold value. The computer simulation results show the effectiveness
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of the proposed new algorithm. Using the proposed technique of choosing the
dominating set randomly is shown to be inefficient. It is shown that not only
reducing the dominating set size improves the performance, but the accuracy of
choosing the dominating set members is a main factor for routing performance.
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Chapter 6
Message Security and Network
Access
6.1 Problem Overview
The nature of the DTN environment introduces new security constraints and
challenges [101, 102]. Long delays combined with the lack of continuous com-
munications with a network server introduce new challenges in information se-
curity for mobile nodes in a DTN environment. Many new challenges have
been addressed for this environment such as how to stimulate positive coop-
eration among nodes. Nodes cooperation is very essential in this environment
for successful communications [85]. Many studies have been addressing this
issue using reputation based schemes [103] or credit-based schemes [104–106].
Among challenges in a DTN due to long delays and frequent disconnections, one
major open issue is how to limit unwanted (i.e., unauthorized) traffic within a
network. The problem of preventing unauthorized traffic in regular networks is
handled analogues to the problem of authentication, authorization and account-
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ing (AAA). Authenticating a user and assigning access privileges in traditional
networks are performed by a special network node such as an access point in
a wireless local area network (WLAN), a base station in a cellular network, or
a trusted server in general. In DTN, long delays and frequent disconnections
make a continuous contact with such trusted server impossible. As a result, a
new scheme is required to cope with the new constraints.
In DTN, an end-to-end route between the message source and the destina-
tion consists of a sequence of intermediate nodes, in addition to the end nodes.
These intermediate nodes can either play a special role in the network such as
message mules [44, 56] or be regular nodes [6]. The process of message delivery
requires message storing and forwarding by intermediate nodes, which consumes
network resources in terms of node buffer space and radio spectrum bandwidth.
As a result, identifying and limiting unauthorized messages will reduce the over-
head imposed on the network. However, this requires the intermediate nodes to
be able to authenticate each message and verify its original sender’s eligibility
to use the network before accepting the message. There is no general solution
proposed for this problem within the DTN architecture [102]. Most of existing
solutions are highly specialized to a specific network scenario. For example,
the work in [107] assumes that each node knows all eligible nodes’ public keys.
When a message is received, the signature is verified against all known eligible
public keys. This technique is difficult to scale for a large network with increased
number of nodes. Related techniques have been introduced for a vehicular net-
work, such as the HAB (huge anonymous keys based) protocol [108]. The HAB
protocol is to secure vehicular networks where each node possesses a huge set
of keys to sign messages. There are many techniques that use the same idea of
asymmetric key cryptography with a pre-distributed set of keys at each node
such as [109], [110] and [111]. A problem with all these techniques is the exten-
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sive use of asymmetric key cryptography, which consumes a significant amount
of resources in terms of node computing power. This problem is addressed for
vehicular networks in [112], where the proposed solution uses symmetric key
cryptography, when a connection is available with a road side unit (RSU), to
reduce the overhead.
Using asymmetric key cryptography in the DTN environment for message
authentication introduces computation overhead over intermediate nodes. Table
6.1 shows a comparison of the computational requirements for different asym-
metric key cryptographic signing algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA. The
results in the table are based on running the Crypto++ 5.6.0 [113] benchmark
on Intel Core 2 1.83 GHz processor under Windows Vista in 32-bit mode. As
shown in Table 6.1, the asymmetric key techniques introduces extra computa-
tion overhead, in terms of the required computations to perform the operation,
compared with the computation required when using symmetric key techniques
as shown in Table 6.2. The computation overhead is a critical factor in a DTN
environment as the nodes are devices with limited battery power. Moreover,
in terms of the security strength of the symmetric key techniques in compari-
son with asymmetric key techniques, Table 6.3 [116] shows a security strength
comparison among suite B [117] different cryptography algorithms. The AES
technique, even with small size key, can be comparable to ECDSA and RSA with
much larger size keys. An intermediate node in DTN networks has to perform
a verification operation for each received message to be accepted for storing in
its buffer and for forwarding. As a result, we choose the RSA technique for our
discussion as the RSA verification operation requires less computation overhead
compared to the RSA signature operation. Moreover, using asymmetric key
cryptography techniques for message authentication implies additional commu-
nication overhead. The communication overhead is introduced due to the need
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to exchange the public key certificate of message sender with the message. The
certificate size is in terms of hundreds of bytes if ECDSA is employed or in
terms of kilobytes if RSA is employed. This transmission overhead is translated
into additional transmission energy consumption overhead. As an example of
this energy consumption, the work in [114] addresses that consumption for a
Chipcon CC1000 radio used in Crossbow MICA2DOT motes to be 28.6 µJ to
receive one byte and 59.2 µJ to transmit one byte. Many research efforts in
DTNs, such as [115, 119], address this overhead by performing message batches
processing.
It should be noted that we base our discussion on the Crypto++ benchmark
as a reference. However, some existing hardware implementation can achieve
much better performance for ECDSA. With the proper hardware implementa-
tion, ECDSA can be a much better choice than RSA, considering the smaller
size for ECDSA keys compared to RSA keys as shown in Table 6.3. Our main
solution addresses the problem of the overhead imposed by using asymmetric
key techniques, by calculating the message authentication through symmetric
key techniques such as AES.
Table 6.1: Asymmetric key based techniques benchmark [113].
Algorithm Mega cycle per operation
2048-bit RSA signature 11.06
2048-bit RSA verification 0.29
ECDSA over GF(p) NIST P-256 signature 3.92
ECDSA over GF(p) NIST P-256 verification 6.56
Another major open issue in a DTN is how to secure end-to-end message
exchanges. Unlike regular networks, it is difficult in a DTN environment to con-
trol message route. A malicious intermediate node that gets a copy of a message
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Table 6.2: Symmetric key based techniques and cryptographic hash functions
benchmark [113].
Algorithm Cycle per byte
AES with 256-bit key 18.2




Table 6.3: Security strengths comparison for a subset of the NSA suite B cryp-
tography algorithms [116].
Security Symmetric key IFC ECC (ECDSA, Digital signatures
strength algorithms (RSA) ECDH, ECMQV) and hash-only
applications
80 2TDEA 1024 160− 223 SHA− 1
112 3TDEA 2048 224− 255 SHA− 224
128 AES − 128 3072 256− 383 SHA− 256
192 AES − 192 7680 384− 511 SHA− 384
256 AES − 256 15360 512+ SHA− 512
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can disclose and/or change the message contents. As a result, end-to-end mes-
sage security (i.e., message confidentiality and authenticity) is a necessity in
a DTN. Secure end-to-end messages exchanges require mutual authentication
between the communicating parties, i.e., the sender and receiver(s). In a large
size network scenario, mutual authentication requires the communication with
a trusted third party (e.g., certificate authority). Traditional techniques for
end-to-end security cannot be applied directly to a DTN environment due to
the potential unavailability of a physical end-to-end path either between the
message’s sender and the receiver or between each of them and a trusted third
party. Without available communications with a trusted third party, communi-
cating parties are not able to perform mutual authentication in a timely manner
to allow the communication. There are some adaptations of regular techniques
to handle this problem within a DTN, such as the work in [118] which proposes
to use Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) and to adapt the regular public
key cryptography to achieve secure end-to-end message exchanges. The main
idea is to minimize the required communication with a trusted third party to
overcome the unavailiabity of a continuous connection with the trusted third
party. However, most of the proposed techniques are based on asymmetric key
cryptography. We propose a technique for achieving end-to-end secure message
exchanges within the super node architecture, which employs symmetric key
cryptography to reduce the computation overhead associated with asymmetric
key cryptography. The main idea is to map the problem of node mutual au-
thentication from the unreliable network domain ( i.e., between communicating
nodes) to a reliable network domain (i.e., between super nodes).
Our contributions [3, 4] can be summarized as five folds: i) Adopting tradi-
tional PKI based certificates for limiting unauthorized traffic within the super
node system; ii) proposing the new idea of separating the problems of message
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sender authentication and message authorization at an intermediate node; iii)
introducing a new technique based on symmetric key cryptography, employing
the concept of one-way key chain, and introducing the concept of key group
to reduce the overhead induced by asymmetric key cryptography techniques;
iv) evaluating the performance of the proposed techniques over different rout-
ing techniques; and v) introducing the idea of moving the problem of mutual
authentication to super nodes in order to reduce overhead imposed on the com-
municating mobile nodes.
6.2 The System Model Assumptions
Preventing unauthorized traffic over the super nodes system implies preventing
it over the access networks. However, within the super nodes system, some
access networks already have a security infrastructure to prevent unauthorized
nodes from using the networks such as cellular networks and secure WLANs. As
a result, here we focus on wireless networks that do not have an infrastructure
such as MANETs. The MANET model under consideration is similar to the
model described in Section 4.1.
The role of granting network access to a mobile node should be assigned to
a specific entity. This entity is determined based on the network under con-
sideration. In our system model, the gateway grants network access to nodes
currently connected through the network under its jurisdiction. The gateway
is assumed to have no-knowledge about node private information such as pass-
words, current status, etc. In order to decide whether or not to grant access to a
node, the gateway contacts the super node responsible for the node. The com-
munication between the gateway and the super node is assumed to be reliable
and secure over the Internet backbone. Each super node and the gateway have
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a public-private key pair. Each node should know the public key of its super
node. Each node has a public-private key pair and the public key is stored at
its super node.
In developing a solution, the following assumptions are made:
1. Super nodes are trusted (similar to the trusted third party in regular
networks);
2. Super nodes can be under different jurisdictions (e.g., ownership), so that
nodes’ private information (e.g., password, messages) may be not sharable
among different super nodes;
3. Each super node has a public/private key pair, and the public key is known
to all the other super nodes and to all the nodes under its jurisdiction;
4. Any node in the system knows its own super node’s public key and does
not have to know the public key of any other super node in the system;
5. Each node has a public/private key pair, and the public key is stored at
its super node;
6. Super nodes and gateways can communicate with each other efficiently
and securely over the Internet backbone;
7. A loose time synchronization can be achieved among nodes and super
nodes, that all nodes and super nodes agree on the current time with an
error tolerance less than message time to live (as will be discussed next).
In the rest of this chapter, we use the notations summarized in Table 6.4.
103
Table 6.4: The Notations Overview.
Notation Description
IDA the public identifier of entity A
| message concatenation operation
SA the super node of node A
PKA the public key of node A
SKA the private key of node A
EncK(·) symmetric key encryption function with key K using AES
DecK(·) symmetric key decryption function with key K using AES
Ki symmetric key with index i
EX(·) asymmetric key encryption function with key X using RSA
DX(·) asymmetric key decryption function with key X using RSA
H(·) one-way hash function such as SHA-1
Hi(·) applying hash function H for i times
HMACK(·) a keyed-hash message authentication code, which is generated with
symmetric key K
KGn a key group of length n
PP The public parameter for Private Key Generator (PKG)
G(·) Private key generating function for IBC technique
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6.3 Preventing unauthorized network access
Within the MANET access network, any roaming node can send a message over
the network. Regardless of the sender, the intermediate nodes will carry and
forward this message to either its destination (if it is within the network) or the
gateway (if the destination is in another network). The main goal of this work
is to prevent the messages of unauthorized users to be carried over the network.
However, unauthorized nodes can roam over the network and participate (if
they want) in message forwarding of other authorized nodes, yet they cannot
send their own messages. This assumption is based on the work introduced
in [120] which argues that unauthorized nodes can help in delivering messages
in the network as the unpredictable nature of a DTN reduces the effectiveness of
tampering with message attacks to that of simple network failures. As a result,
our goal is not to prevent unauthorized nodes from participating in message
forwarding as data mules, but to prevent them from being able to send their
own messages over the network.
One approach to solve the problem is to let intermediate nodes carry and
forward a message regardless whether or not the sender is allowed to use the
network resources (i.e., to send the message over the network). As the message
reaches the gateway, the gateway can check the message sender and discard the
message. This solution does not prevent unauthorized traffic, because message
discarding occurs at the gateway after an unauthorized message has already
been carried over the network and sometimes it may be delivered without going
through the gateway (i.e., if the destination node is connected over the same
network). However, this approach moves the message checking process to the
gateway, which reduces message checking overhead imposed on the intermediate
nodes. On the other hand, with an increased number of unauthorized messages,
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the network performance degrades (as to be discussed in Section 6.5).
The two approaches proposed in the following depend mainly on attaching
a message authentication code (MAC ) block to each message. Using this block,
any intermediate node can decide to carry the message or to discard it without
the need to contact a third party. The difference between the two approaches
is how to calculate the MAC block. The first approach is based on asymmetric
key cryptography which is inefficient for the system model under consideration.
This is mainly due to the computation overhead, as shown in Table 6.1, im-
posed over intermediate nodes. This overhead increases with increased number
of forwarded messages, as the number of required message signature verifica-
tions increases. Moreover, attaching the public key certificate of the message
source node to the message for verification increases the size of the transmit-
ted/received data. This imposes energy overhead over an intermediate node
as discussed in Section 6.1. As a result, the second approach is based on a
new idea of redefining the problem to separate the message authorization from
the message sender authentication. The second approach uses symmetric key
cryptography to reduce the overhead encountered in the first approach.
6.3.1 PKI Certificate Based Scheme
Public key management is still an open problem for DTN security [102]. In
our approach, public key certificate can be defined within the standard X.509
[121] public key certificates. However, X.509 implementations over a DTN have
restrictions to adapt with the DTN constraints. The main concern we address
is inefficiency of implementing Certificate Revocation List (CRL) checking due
to the unavailability of a continuous connection between the certificate server
and individual nodes over the network. Therefore, in our approach we define
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certificate revocation based on the certificate expiration time only.
The gateway is the node that can decide which user is eligible to use the
network resources, i.e., it acts as a trusted third party. However, a continuous
contact with the gateway from a mobile node is likely not possible to allow the
intermediate nodes to verify message sender eligibility to use the resources. One
possible solution is to let the gateway act as a certificate authority which issues
a PKI certificate for each authorized user.
When a node, A, first connects to the network, it should contact its super
node, SA. This connection message must travel through the gateway to reach
the super node:
ConnectMsg ← IDA | IDnet | T imeStamp | SIGA,
SIGA ← ESKA(H(IDA | IDnet | T imeStamp)).
Based on the connection message, the super node can authenticate the user
identity and inform the gateway whether or not this user should be granted
access over the network and the period of granted access. As the super node
knows the node public key, it constructs a permission message and sends it back
to the gateway:
PermMsg ← IDA | IDnet | Duration | T imeStamp | PKgateway
| PKA | SIGSA ,
SIGSA ← ESKSA (H(IDA | IDnet | Duration | T imeStamp
| PKgateway | PKA)).
As the node does not know the public key of the gateway, the super node
includes the gateway public key in the permission message to authenticate the
gateway. The gateway uses this message and issues a temporary certificate to
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grant the node an access to the network:
CertA ← IDA | IDnet | ExpT ime | PKgateway | PKA | SIGgateway,
SIGgateway ← ESKgateway(H(IDA | IDnet | ExpT ime | PKgateway | PKA)).
The node checks the authenticity of the certificate by checking the permission
message. To send a message over the network, the node signs the message with
its private key and sends the signed message with the certificate. Intermediate
nodes can check the message authenticity by checking the certificate. This
implies that each intermediate node performs two asymmetric cryptographic
operations per carried message, one to check the message signature and the
other to check the certificate itself. Based on the routing technique used, the
intermediate node forwards the message with its certificate attached.
Limiting the certificate lifetime overcomes the problem of certificate revoca-
tion in order to revoke node access. Upon certificate expiration, the node can
recontact the gateway to request more network access time. The problem with
this approach is the overhead imposed by the required number of asymmetric
key cryptographic operations. A message sender should sign the message in
order to forward it. Each intermediate node receiving the message should verify
the signature and the sender’s certificate, which requires two verifications op-
erations per forwarded message. An increased number of forwarded messages
increases the computation overhead, as discussed in Section 6.1, over interme-
diate nodes which are expected to be power limited portable devices.
6.3.2 Symmetric Key Based Scheme
This main proposed technique uses symmetric key cryptography to reduce the
number of required asymmetric key cryptograhic operations and hence the im-
posed overhead. The technique uses the concept of one-way key chain [122].
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One-Way Key Chain
The one-way key chain [122] is a sequence of keys generated by consecutive
applications of one-way hash function. Figure 6.1 shows the generation of one-
Figure 6.1: One-way key chain of length L.
way key chain with a seed key K0, which is randomly chosen. The chain is
generated by consecutive applications of one-way hash function H(.) to the
seed value (i.e., key). Any key Kx can be used to reveal any subsequent key
Ky, where y ≥ x. By the one-way hash function definition, a key Ky cannot
be used to obtain a key Kx where x < y because this implies to reverse the
one-way hash function. As a result, the direction of key usage, in the chain, is
in the reverse direction of the key generation.
For example, for a key chain of length L with initial key K0, the generation
requires applying the hash function H for L− 1 times; but the first key to use
is KL−1, the second key is KL−2, and so on. To generate a key Ki, the hash
function should be repeatedly applied for i times on the seed key:
H i(K0) = Ki, 0 < i < L.
A protocol, TESLA [122], is introduced to secure broadcast communication,
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using a one-way key chain generated by the message sender. The sender com-
putes a MAC block for each message based on the current key of the chain. As
the message receiver cannot validate the message because the key is known only
to the sender, it buffers the received messages until it receives the used key in a
subsequent message. When the key is disclosed, it becomes useless for malicious
nodes because its time frame is over. The main issue in TESLA is message de-
livery time synchronization between message sender and the receivers. TESLA
cannot be used over a DTN because a message sender discloses the key to the
receivers in subsequent messages. Long delays in a DTN will cause a very long
delay between message reception and message approval. Quick disclosing of the
key may speed up message approval, but it will cause delayed messages to be
discarded. As a result, TESLA cannot be applied in a DTN where message
delivery time cannot be controlled.
The proposed scheme
The introduced idea is based on the fact that the asymmetric key cryptography
based technique not only proves the message legitimately, but also authenticates
the sender identity which is not required in the problem under consideration.
The authentication of the sender identity should be a problem of the message
destination (not intermediate nodes), which is part of the process of establishing
end-to-end security. Intermediate nodes need only to ensure that any received
message is authorized to be carried over the network, but not to prove the
identity of its sender.
With a symmetric key to compute a message signature using a key hashing
algorithm, only authorized nodes should know the key that will be regularly
updated by the network gateway. The network access time assigned to a node
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varies depending on the node, similar to the certificate lifetime. The gateway
can generate a set of keys, and each key is to be used within a time frame in
the network. Nodes check each received message against the key used when
the message are issued based on the message time stamp. Due to potential
long delays in message delivery, existing messages may belong to different time
frames and consequently different keys. This requires that a new node should
receive not only the keys that cover its network access period but also old keys
to participate in message forwarding. This is solved by employing the concept
of one-way key chain.
The network gateway generates a key chain to be used over a long time
period. The gateway splits the time period into equal durations (frames), and
each key in the chain is used for a specified duration. Based on how long a node
is permitted to access the network, a subset of the chain (key group) is shared
with the node. To send a message, the sender node generates a MAC block
using a key based on the message time stamp. Intermediate nodes check the
MAC block against the shared key chain to check if the message is legitimate
to be carried or not.
As shown in Figure 6.2, when a node, A, connects to the mobile ad-hoc
network supervised by gateway, G, it sends a connection message to its super
node. When the super node receives the message, it sends a permission message
to the gateway. The gateway grants network access to this node for a specific
time period by sending a key group that covers this period. For example, if the
key lifetime is tkey, and the gateway wants to grant an access period of 5tkey,
then the gateway should send the current key and the next 4 keys to he node.
We call the keys key group (KG). If the current key is Kx, the key group of
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Figure 6.2: Granting network access for node A over network supervised by
gateway G.
size n is a concatenation of n key:
KGn ← kx | kx−1 | . . . | kx−n+1.
To reduce the message size, the gateway does not need to send all the keys in
the key group, but only the last key Kx−n+1 in the group and the group length.
The node can generate the group by consecutively applying the hash function.
The gateway generates the network access message by encrypting the key group
with the node public key:
AccessMessage ← EPKA(KGn | T imeStamp).
After verifying the access message and the permission message, the node gets
the key group and starts communicating over the network.
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It should be noted that the node can generate all the keys that precede the
first key in the key group (using the hash function). It is expected that the
messages already circulating in the network are encrypted using previous keys,
so that the node can verify the validity of these messages. The node cannot
generate any key for a future time period using the key group based on the
one-way key chain properties. For example, the node that received a key group
KGn with current key Kx can generate any previous key Ki where L−1 ≥ i > x
. If a node needs to communicate over the network after the expiry of its key
group, it should re-register with the gateway.
After obtaining the key group, the node can start communicating with other
nodes. When the node wants to send a message, it needs to generate a MAC
block using the current network key and forwards it to neighbor nodes (based
on the routing technique applied). The message exchanges are in the form of
ExchangedMsg ← msg | T imeStamp | MAC,
MAC ← HMACKx(Msg | T imeStamp).
When an intermediate node receives a message, it checks the MAC block and
then stores the message to be forwarded. The intermediate node is not able
to disclose the message contents because the message, msg, should already be
encrypted with another key shared between the source and the destination to
achieve end-to-end secure communications, as discussed in Section 6.4.
To prevent any node from continuing the communication with a previously
granted key group, messages sent with expired keys are discarded as follow: Key
Ki has a time frame [tx, tx + tkey] and each message has a TTL = tmessage. If
a message at time t > tx + tkey + tmessage is authorized with key Ki, it will be
discarded.
With the proposed approach, a message sender needs to perform one sym-
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metric key encryption per message. Each intermediate node also needs to per-
form one symmetric key decryption per message. Intermediate nodes store the
original message (if valid) for future forwarding. They do not need to re-compute
the message MAC when forwarding the message.
6.4 End-to-end Message Security
The importance of message security in a DTN environment is due to the diffi-
culty to control the message route or to trust the intermediate nodes. A message
may be routed through a malicious node, which can disclose and/or change the
message contents. A message receiver needs to authenticate the sender identity
and the contents of the message. Also, the message sender needs to authenticate
the message’s receiver and to ensure that only the receiver can decrypt the mes-
sage contents. In regular networks, a mutual authentication between the sender
and the receiver is performed before a secure end-to-end path is established for
communications. The mutual authentication requires the presence of a trusted
third party (e.g., certificate authority) to perform the mutual authentication
phase between the communicating parties.
Regular techniques cannot be applied directly to a DTN environment due
to the potential unavailability of a physical end-to-end path either between
message’s sender and the receiver or between any of them and a trusted third
party. Moreover, without available communications with a trusted third party,
the two communicating parties are not able to authenticate each other in a
timely manner to allow the communication. There are some adaptations of




Figure 6.3: Traditional public key cryptography for DTN [118].
The traditional public key cryptography technique encounters, over a DTN,
the problems of unavailability of communications with the trusted third party
and limited node ability to use asymmetric encryption due to power constraints.
In [118], an approach is proposed to cope with the problems by i) minimizing
the number of required contacts with the trusted third party, and ii) moving
part of asymmetric decryption operation to the third party to minimize the
overhead imposed on the receiver. Figure 6.3 shows the scenario introduced
in [118]. The sender of message msg picks any random key K and generates the
cipher text C. The sender generates an envelope ENV using the key server’s
(i.e., the trusted third part) public key that encloses the used secret key, and
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sends both C and ENV to the receiver, given by
C ← EncK(msg)
ENV ← EPKKeyServer(IDReceiver|K).
In order to extract the key from the envelope to decrypt the cipher, the receiver
sends the received envelope to the key server. The key server decrypts the
envelope to recover the key and sends the key back to the receiver encrypted
with a previously shared key KShared with the receiver. The receiver recovers
the key and the original message as follow:








There are several advantages of the approach: It overcomes the need for
certificate validation and revocation by forcing the shared key disclosure through
the key server; It moves receiver’s identity authentication to the key server. On
the other hand, it does not handle the sender’s authentication, which can be
solved by adding the sender’s identifier and a signature (with the key shared
between the sender and the key server) to the envelope. The sender still needs
to perform asymmetric encryption to send the shared key to the receiver. The
approach will cause received messages’ decryption to be delayed until a contact
occurs with the key server.
Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) [123] is a cryptographic method which
enables message asymmetric key encryption and signature verification using a
public identifier of the receiver as the receiver’s key. This technique uses a
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commonly trusted node as the private key generator (PKG). The PKG has a
public parameter PP and its correspondence secret key SKPKG. The public
identifier can be, for example, a web address or an email address. The PKG can
generate a private key SKA for any user A with public identifier IDA. Before
generating a private key based on the user’s public identifier, the PKG must
verify that the user is allowed to use this identifier for secure communications.
A user, A, signs any outgoing message with the private key SKA. The message
receiver verifies the signature using the sender’s public identifier IDA and PP .
Messages intended for user A are encrypted using IDA and PP , so that only
user A can decrypt them with the secret key SKA.
Figure 6.4: Identity based cryptography for DTN [118].
Figure 6.4 shows a scenario suggested in [118] for secure communications
between two nodes over a DTN using IBC. For message, msg, the sender picks
a random key K for symmetric encryption and generates a cipher text C and
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an envelope ENV :
C ← EncK(msg)
ENV ← EPP,IDReceiver(K).
The sender sends both C and ENV to the receiver. The receiver decrypts the
original message from the cipher text after extracting the shared secret key from
the envelope using the private key associated with its public identity used. The
receiver gets the key information out of the envelope and extracts the original
message as follows:
K ← DSKReceiver(ENV )
msg ← DecK(C).
The PKG generates the private key associated with the receiver’s public iden-
tifier. It uses a secret key KShared already shared with the receiver to make a
secure message t
′
containing the generated private key. The PKG then sends
the message to the receiver which extracts the private key as follow:







In this scenario, the receiver can independently receive the associated private
key from the PKG. If the receiver does not already have the private key, the
received message decryption will be delayed until a communication opportunity
with the PKG occurs.
The main advantage of IBC over the traditional public key cryptography
is the use of node public identifier as the node public key, which removes the
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necessity of contacting the trusted third party to verify node certificate (i.e.,
checking node authenticity). However, the problem of updating and revoking
these certificates (i.e., public/private key pairs) still exists in this scenario. This
is solved in [124] by periodically refreshing the node public identifier and hence
its private key, where the node public identifier is made by combining a long
lived identifier with a description of the validity period (e.g., a day). For ex-
ample, hsamuel@uwaterloo.ca:18-08-2010 refers to the public identifier that
hsamuel can use for encrypting the messages on August 18, 2010. A key holder
should periodically contact the PKG to receive updated keys. The IBC solves
the problem of sender and receiver authentication without the need to contact
a trusted third party. However, it is argued in [102] that the checking of the
public parameter PP is equivalent to verifying the certificate in traditional pub-
lic key cryptography. Moreover, the IBC does not solve the problem of limited
node power to cope with asymmetric key cryptographic operations for message
security.
Both traditional public key cryptography and IBC techniques can be adapted
to suit the super nodes system by letting node’s super node play the role of
key server or PKG. However, using these techniques requires roaming nodes
to extensively perform asymmetric key cryptographic operations. Moreover,
traditional public key cryptography imposes a long delay on received message
decryption due to the potential long disconnections to the node. Next, we
propose a technique that depends mainly on symmetric encryption to reduce
overhead and uses the idea of key chains to achieve timely updates for node
keys.
119
6.4.2 The Proposed Security Approach
Preventing unauthorized users from sending their messages over the network
does not implies the confidentiality of exchanged authentic messages. Any ma-
licious node that receives a message for forwarding can expose the message
contents. Due to the inability to control the message forwarding route within
the system under consideration (especially for an unstructured open network
such as MANET), secure end-to-end message exchanges are mandatory.
In the system under consideration, the existence of super nodes that can
communicate reliably and securely over the Internet backbone offers an advan-
tage to relax the constraints of end-to-end secure message exchanges. The main
idea is to use the super node as a node delegate that performs the mutual au-
thentication and key sharing on behalf of the mobile node. Under the super-node
architecture, there are two communication scenarios for node-to-node message
exchanges: 1) the message sender and receiver can find a physical end-to-end
path, and 2) a physical end-to-end path cannot be established, so that messages
are routed through the destination’s super node. In both cases, the source node
should contact the destination’s super node. For the first case, the source node
has to contact the destination’s super node to locate the destination, while in
the second case all messages are sent through the super node.
Secure Communications between Node and Super Node
We propose to use symmetric encryption to ensure information security for
communications between a node and its super node. All message exchanges
are encrypted using a shared secret key, which reduces the overhead imposed
by asymmetric key cryptography based techniques. The shared key is updated
periodically to prevent its exposure. Updating the shared key requires hand-
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shaking between the node and its super node, which is challenging with the
expected node’s frequent long disconnections. To handle key updates, a key
chain is shared between the node and its super node. The key chain is used for
a period of time which is divided into time frames of equal length and, for each
time frame, a specific key from the chain is used to secure the communications.
At the end of a time frame, both the node and its super node update the shared
key to the next key from the key chain without the need of any handshaking be-
tween them. After all the keys from the chain are used, a new key chain will be
generated and shared between the node and its super node. This technique does
not need to include the secret key in the exchanged messages as in traditional
asymmetric cryptography based techniques. Asymmetric key cryptography is
used only during the chain initialization to securely exchange the key chain and
to allow the communicating parties to authenticate each others, as discussed
next.
Figure 6.5 shows the proposed procedure for establishing secure communica-
tions between a node, A, and its super node SA. When a node, A, is connected
through an access network, it sends a connection message to its super node to
update the super node with its current location and to be granted the privilege
to access the access network resources as discussed in Section 6.3. If there is
no shared key chain or a previously shared chain expired, node A initializes a
new chain by generating a random key as the chain seed value K0 and length
L. The node prepares the connection message as:
ConnectMsg ← IDA | IDnet | EPKSA (K0 | L) | T imeStamp | SIGA,
SIGA ← ESKA(H(IDA | IDnet | EPKSA (K0 | L) | T imeStamp)).
The access network identifier IDnet is to inform the super node of its current
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Figure 6.5: Secure communications between a node and its super node.
location. The connection message contains a time stamp field to prevent a reply
attack. The key chain information is encrypted with the super node public key
to ensure that only the super node can decrypt this information. The node signs
the message with its private key to enable the super node to authenticate the
sender identity. The super node verifies the connection message and initializes
the key chain. The super node sends access information to the node as discussed
Section 3.2. The node and its super node can start exchanging messages secured
with the current shared key, Ki, from the shared key chain:
ExchangedMsg ← (EncKi(msg | T imeStamp) | i).
The node does not have to initialize a new key chain until all the keys in the
current key chain are used. This allows the node to be disconnected from its
super node while keeping an up-to-date shared key without any handshaking
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between them.
Due to the expected delay in message delivery, messages may not be delivered
in sequence. Hence, the receiver (i.e., the node or its super node) may receive
messages encrypted with the keys out of order, or with previous keys other than
the current key. The proposed technique addresses this potential problem by
including a time stamp in the message. The receiver accepts the message as
long as the key index matches the enclosed time stamp.
Securing Node-to-Node Communications
To establish a secure end-to-end message exchange between two nodes, our pro-
posal is to use the destination node’s super node as the destination’s delegate.
This moves the mutual authentication process from the communicating nodes
(where the communication is challenged) to their super nodes (where the com-
munication is reliable and secure). The first step for communications between
two nodes is that the source node inquiries about the destination node location
from the destination node’s super node. This step can be used to enable the
destination super node to authenticate the source node identity. The destina-
tion super node issues a permission for secure communication in the form of
an access ticket that the source node can use to communicate with the des-
tination node. With the access ticket, the destination node does not need to
re-authenticate the source node as the ticket proves that the sender is authenti-
cated by the destination super node. Moreover, the source node does not need
to authenticate the destination node because the destination node is the only
one who can extract the shared key information from the ticket.
Figure 6.6 shows the proposed procedure to establish a secure end-to-end
message transfer between two nodes. Suppose that node B wants to start a
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Figure 6.6: The procedure to establish an end-to-end secure message exchange.
secure communication with node A. Node B locates the super node SA and
sends a communication request, Req, to SA as follow:




The authentication part in the request message is encrypted by the current
shared key between node B and its super node. If SA is not the super node
of node B, it cannot authenticate the sender identity. As a result, it forwards
the request message to node SB (based on the assumption that super nodes
can communicate reliably and securely over the Internet backbone). Node SB
verifies that node B is the sender of this message based on their shared key chain
and generates access ticket, ticketB, to SA for a secure communication with node
B. Super node SB replies to SA with an access message that is secured based
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on the assumed existing secure connection between the super nodes:
ticketB ← i | EncKi(IDA | IDSA | KB | T imeStamp
| ExpirationT ime),
AccessMsg ← KB | ExpirationT ime | ticketB.
The access ticket ticketB can be used only by node A and/or its super node
SA, which is declared as a part of the ticket. The ticket also contains a randomly
generated secret key KB to secure the communications with node B. The ticket
is valid for a period of time determined by ExpirationT ime field. The access
ticket ticketB authenticates both nodes A and SA identities to node B. When
SA receives the access message that confirms the identity of node B, it generates
an access ticket (ticketA) using the current key, Kj, from the key chain shared
with node A. Super node SA sends an access message to node B that contains
node A location and ticketA:
ticketA ← j | EncKj(IDB | IDSB | KB | T imeStamp
| ExpirationT ime)
AccessMsg ← LocationA | ticketB | EncKB(ExpirationT ime | ticketA).
When node B receives the access message, KB can be extracted from the
ticket ticketB using Ki. Node B can start communicating with node A or its
super node (if no end-to-end path exists). Each message msg sent from node
B to node A is encrypted using the shared key KB. An exchanged message
includes the encrypted message and the access tickets, given by
ExchangedMsg ← EncKB(msg) | ticketA | ticketB.
When node A receives the message, it checks ticketA using Kj, and then it
decrypts the message using KB obtained from the ticket. Note that, unlike the
125
previous techniques [118], a message receiver does not need to authenticate the
message sender and it can decrypt the message without any delay or asymmetric
cryptography overhead. Moreover, node A can reply to node B using ticketB so
that the communication proceeds without any need to contact the super nodes
again for authorization.
To prevent using expired tickets in communications, messages sent with
expired tickets are discarded as follow: Given that the ticket expiration time
tticket and each message has a TTL = tmessage, if a message using this ticket is
received at time t > tticket + tmessage, the message will be discarded.
A main challenge for authentication over DTN is the delay required for
handshaking to complete the authentication process. In our scheme, the delay
is minimized by using the mandatory message sent to the super node to locate
the destination node. As a result, the sender does not need to send a separate
message for authentication. Moreover, within the lifetime of the issued ticket,
the sender does not need to re-send an authentication message for each mes-
sage. Note that there exist some research efforts to provide a self organized
authentication without the need to contact a trusted third party, such as the
work in [125]. The technique is based on the self signed certificates issued by
the nodes themselves. A main concern for the technique to be adapted to the
super node architecture is the size of required certificate repositories within each
node, taking into consideration the large size of the interconnected networks.
The authentication requires processing a graph of the intersection among the
node certificate repositories, which can be very large for roaming nodes with
a possibility of no shared certificates. With the expected unavailability of the
communicating nodes and/or an end-to-end path, the handshaking required for
the authentication (i.e., to exchange the certificates) can either cause a long
delay for the communication or prevent the communication completely. As it is
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the responsibility of the nodes to authenticate each other, the existing technique
imposes a processing overhead to all the nodes.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
We extend the simulation experiments introduced in Section 4.6 as follows. We
study how the proposed security schemes affect system performance under two
different routing techniques: the epidemic routing and the dominating set (DS)
based routing. In the epidemic routing, each node forwards a message to all
its neighboring nodes, in anticipation that one of these nodes may meet with
the destination node in the near future as it roams. This may be inefficient
in terms of network resource usage, however it is sometimes necessary. On the
other hand, the DS routing limits the number of forwarded messages required to
deliver a message by limiting the number of nodes to which the message should
be forwarded by a node. The DS routing counts on forwarding the message
only to the DS members, which are nodes that have a high probability to meet
with all the other nodes in the network. We compare the performance of the
proposed authorization techniques with that of the system with no authoriza-
tion. The performance is measured in terms of (1) the number of forwarded
messages over the network to demonstrate how efficiently each technique uses
the available resources (e.g., radio spectrum bandwidth), and (2) the number
of undelivered authorized messages to indicate how reliable the technique is in
delivering authorized messages. We compare the two proposed security tech-
niques in terms of the number of asymmetric key cryptographic operations to
measure how efficient the intermediate node computing power is used, with an
increasing number of forwarded messages.
In our experiments, the MANET coverage area is a square of size 10 × 10
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partitions. Each simulation proceeds in discrete time steps. There are 50 mobile
nodes with mobility trajectories independent of each other. For each simulation
run, a transition matrix M is randomly generated and stays fixed till the end
of the simulation. Initially, the node locations are uniformly distributed over
the service area. As the simulation time increases, each node (if connected)
moves randomly according to the transition matrix. When a node moves to a
new partition, it stays there for a residence time that is an exponential random
variable with an average of 20 simulation steps. At the end of the residence time,
the node moves to a new partition with a probability of 0.7, or disconnects from
the network with a probability of 0.3. If the node disconnects, it will stay
disconnected for a duration that is exponentially distributed with an average of
20 time steps. For simplicity, we assume that a node is able to communicate
only with other nodes in the same partition. Messages are generated based on
a Poisson process with mean rate of 103 messages per time step. The source
and destination mobile nodes for each message are selected at random. All the
messages are equal in size, with the same message time to live of 40 simulation
steps. The buffer space is 15 messages at each mobile node and 2000 messages
at the gateway. When the node buffer is full and a new message is received,
the oldest message in the buffer is removed to accommodate the new message.
Moreover, 20 percent of the nodes are unauthorized to use the network resources.
They are assumed to behave honestly in carrying and forwarding messages from
others. In addition, they generate their own messages and try to inject them to
the network.
At the start of simulation, all the nodes generate a request message to the
gateway to gain access to the network based on the proposed security scheme
(i.e., they receive a certificate in the first approach or a key group in the second
approach). All the nodes are granted the same access period for simplicity in
128
simulation. When the access period of a node expires, the node has to re-request
access from the gateway. At each time step, the node detects its neighbor nodes
and exchanges the buffered messages with them (the messages that the neigh-
bor nodes do not already have) based on the routing technique. Each node also
updates its buffer by removing expired messages. For each experiment, a com-
munication scenario (i.e., set of messages, user connections, user disconnections,
user movements) is set up randomly and run for each scheme.
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Figure 6.7: Comparison of the proposed authorization schemes in terms of the
number of forwarded under the DS and the epidemic routing.
Figure 6.7 shows a comparison between the case of applying no authoriza-
tion scheme and the case of applying the proposed symmetric key cryptography
based authorization scheme under the epidemic routing and DS routing, in terms
of the total number of forwarded messages. It is clear that, with the existence
of unauthorized traffic, the authorization scheme is important to reduce the
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number of forwarded messages. This applies to both routing techniques under
consideration. Moreover, the number of lost (undelivered) authorized messages
is increased in the case of no authentication, as shown in Figure 6.8. This is
mainly due to the limited buffer space at intermediate nodes which have to drop
old messages when buffer overflow occurs. With an increased number of unau-
thorized messages, the probability of dropping authorized messages increases.
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of the proposed authorization schemes in terms of the
number of lost authorized messages under the DS and the epidemic routing.
Both of the proposed authorization techniques perform equally in terms of
the numbers of forwarded messages and lost messages. However, when compar-
ing them regarding the number of asymmetric key cryptographic operations, it
is clear that the symmetric key based cryptography outperforms the asymmetric
key cryptography based scheme under the routing techniques, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.9. It should be noted that the symmetric key cryptography based scheme
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does not eliminate the usage of asymmetric key cryptographic operations as a
node has to perform asymmetric key operation to request network access and
to receive the key group (if access granted), as discussed in Section 6.3.2. How-
ever, with a larger network size (in terms of number of nodes) and/or a shorter
granted access period per node, even though the symmetric key cryptography
based scheme increases the number of the required asymmetric key crypto-
graphic operations (that are required for messages sent at connecting, and for
initializing the key chain), it still outperforms the asymmetric key scheme. As
a result, it is expected that the symmetric key cryptography based technique
always outperforms the asymmetric key cryptography based technique in terms
of the number of asymmetric key cryptographic operations under all conditions.
Comparing the performance of the two routing techniques under the pro-
posed authorization scheme, Figure 6.7 shows how the DS routing outperforms
the epidemic routing in terms of the number of forwarded messages, which is
consistent with the observation in the absence of unauthorized traffic. In the
presence of unauthorized traffic, even without the authorization, the DS routing
outperforms the epidemic routing, as the DS routing limits the number of nodes
that a message should be forwarded to. On the other hand, Figure 6.8 shows
that, with the authorization scheme in place, the epidemic routing outperforms
the DS routing in terms of the number of lost authorized messages. With the
DS routing, a message is more likely to be expired before a contact occurs be-
tween a message carrying node and the next DS member. However, the number
of lost authorized messages under the DS routing and the authorization scheme
is much smaller than that under either the epidemic routing or the DS routing
without the authorization scheme.
Considering the number of asymmetric key cryptography operations, the DS
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of the proposed authorization schemes in terms of the
number of asymmetric key cryptography operations under the DS and the epi-
demic routing.
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routing outperforms the epidemic routing, when asymmetric key cryptography
based scheme is employed, as shown in Figure 6.9. This is because the number
of asymmetric key cryptography operations is related to the number of message
forwarded in the asymmetric key cryptography based scheme. However, the
epidemic routing and DS routing perform similarly in terms of the number of
asymmetric key operations performed, when the symmetric key cryptography
based scheme is employed. This is due to the fact that the number of asym-
metric key operations in this case is proportional to the number of connection
messages and permission messages sent over the network. The higher number of
lost messages in the DS routing likely results in more lost connection messages
and/or permission messages, which requires the recalculation and resending of
these messages.
We have carried out extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes. The main observations can be summarized in the following:
(a) Both schemes introduce an extra delay for a newly connected node to be
able to communicate in the network. This delay accounts for the time for the
access request to reach the gateway and the time for the node to receive the
access grant information (key group or certificate). However, even with a highly
sparse network, the simulation results show that the delay can be neglected
when compared with the node connection time for the system model under
consideration; (b) Both proposed schemes introduce extra cost as compared
with the case of no authorization procedure. This cost is in the form of extra
message exchanges to request and grant node access and the delay that a node
encounters for accessing the network. This cost becomes obvious with a very
low percentage of unauthorized messages. However, the overhead imposed by
an increase in unauthorized traffic makes the extra message exchanges totally
negligible; (c) When a node needs to extend its network access period, it sends
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a request message to the gateway. This introduces a delay until the response is
sent back. The delay can be eliminated by requesting access in advance before
the current access period is expired. The advance period can be estimated based
on the average message delay that a node encounters in contacting the gateway.
6.6 Related Work
6.6.1 The ZigBee Network
An interesting security technique related to our proposed scheme is implemented
in the ZigBee networks. ZigBeeTMis a registered trademark for the ZigBee al-
liance [127], which is a group of companies that maintain the ZigBee standard.
The ZigBee standard defines a set of protocols for short-range wireless net-
works with low-data-rate, built over the IEEE 802.15.4 layers [126]. The IEEE
802.15.4 standard is developed, independently of the ZigBee standard, for low-
rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs). ZigBee is designed mainly
to provide support for applications that require a low data rate, long battery
life, and secure networking. As a result, the ZigBee standard is suitable for
systems such as sensor networks.
The ZigBee standard uses symmetric key cryptography for message authen-
tication and encryption, based on the AES with 128 bit key [126]. It introduces
the concept of using a device as a trust center. The trust center stores the
keys for a network and authorizes other devices to join the network. A network
key is defined for message authentication over the network. This key should
be globally shared for all nodes authenticated to use the network. The trust
center specifies the current network key and sends the updates to authorized
devices to authenticate their messages over the network. If two devices need to
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communicate securely over the network, they share another key, called link key
in the standard. This key is used for point-to-point secure communication.
The network access scheme employed within the ZigBee standard introduces
an approach similar to our symmetric key based scheme. It uses a network key to
authenticate exchanged messages in order to prevent unauthorized nodes from
communicating over the network. However, the ZigBee security technique does
not address network access revocation for a specific node. This is addressed
in our scheme by allowing the node to have access to a subset of the network
generated key chain (i.e., key group). The way to revoke access from a specific
node within the ZigBee system is to make the trust center update the network
key and inform all other network nodes. Moreover, a major difference is the
implicit assumption in the ZigBee standard that all the nodes are connected
and can access the trust center. The trust center can update the network
key and propagate this update to all the connected nodes immediately. This
assumption cannot be satisfied for the DTN system under consideration. On the
other hand, our technique allows nodes to be able to communicate and update
the network keys even if the trusted third party (i.e., the gateway in our system
and the trust center in the ZigBee system) is unreachable.
Another main difference between the ZigBee security technique and our
aproach is the inability of the ZigBee security technique to tolerate a long delay.
In a ZigBee network, a newly joined node does not need to know the previous
network keys. This is because it is expected that no old messages should be
circulating for long in the network. As a result, this technique cannot be applied
to the DTN system under consideration without a technique to let a new node
authenticate messages already existing in the system. This is achieved in our




Previous techniques introduced in [128–130] address the overhead problem in-
duced by the asymmetric key cryptography authentication techniques over wire-
less networks, where nodes have limited processing power and storage capacity.
These techniques are proposed to replace regular PKI certificates with symmet-
ric key cryptography based certificates. Here we briefly review the techniques
and then discuss why these techniques cannot be applied to our problem domain.
In [128], the TESLA protocol [122] is extended to generate symmetric key
based certificates. This technique is based on the existence of a globally trusted
certificate authority ( CA). The CA generates a one-way key chain to be used
over a long time period, where at time frame i the used key from the key chain
is denoted by KCAi . A node, B, that wants to authenticate its identity to
other nodes at time frame n, contacts CA with their pre-shared symmetric key
KCA,B. The CA generates authentication key KBn to node B to authenticate
its messages starting from the time frame n. It creates a certificate CertCAn(B)
that binds the key KBn to node B at time frame n using its key from the
generated key chain to be used at the time frame n, as follows:
CertCAn(B) ← IDB | EncKCAn (KBn) | n + d
| HMACKCAn (IDB | EncKCAi (KBn) | n + d)
where d > 0 and (n + d) is the time frame when the key KCAn will be disclosed
to the network. Node B can use the issued certificate and the issued key KBn to
authenticate any message it sends over the period [n, n + d]. Any node receiving
a message from B should buffer it until the key KCAn is announced by the CA
at the time frame (n + d). The main assumption for the technique to work is
that the CA can send its announcement to all the network nodes immediately
and reliably. When the key KCAn is known to all the nodes, the key KBn can be
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extracted from the certificate and the buffered messages can be authenticated
by the receivers. Starting from the time frame (n + d), no message can be
authenticated using the key KBn . Node B should request a new certificate for
further communications.
In [129], the technique introduced in [128] is extended for implementing an
authentication framework within sensor networks to authenticate nodes to base
stations. In [130], a variation of the technique is proposed so nodes share a
one-way key chain instead of single key. A node uses its issued certificate key
as anchor for a generated key chain. The node uses the rest of the key chain
to communicate with nodes that received and verified the certificate. However,
the node still needs to request a new certificate if it wants to communicate with
other nodes that have not verified the certificate.
The main similarity between these techniques and our proposed technique
is the use of symmetric key cryptography and key chains for authenticating
messages sent by a node. The main drawback of these techniques is their time
sensitivity. These techniques assume continuous communication between the
certificate authority and all nodes over the network. The work in [130] assumes
this communication is accomplished through a satellite link to achieve continu-
ous availability of the certificate authority. Due to the expected long delays and
the expected unavailability of continuous communication with the certificate
authority, the key exposure is not expected to occur in a timely manner. This
problem makes these techniques not useful within our problem domain.
PKI Lightweight Certificates
Public key management is an open problem for DTN security [102] due to the
DTN characteristics. The main challenge for applying existing public key cer-
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tificate management methods in DTNs is how to efficiently revoke an unexpired
certificate, considering the long communication delays and node limited storage
and communication capabilities. In the bundle security specification [102], a
recommendation is made to use short-time certificates to avoid the certificate
revocation problem. We use this technique in our solution introduced in Section
6.3.1.
Other research efforts in the DTN security area try to address the public
key certificate management problem through implementing an efficient CRL
mechanism. In [114], the problem is addressed by using epidemic routing to
periodically distribute the CRL. Moreover, a technique based on bloom filters
is employed to reduce the storage and transmission needed to make the CRL
distribution efficient. Recent research efforts address the problem of designing a
lightweight certificate for wireless network devices with limited capabilities (in
terms of computing power, and transmission bandwidth). In [131], a technique
is proposed to reduce the certificate size. Also, in [132], the certificate revoca-
tion problem is addressed by trying to find an efficient revocation method for
certificates in VANETs.
ECQV (Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone) Implicit Certificate Scheme [133] is a
new promising technology for implementing lightweight PKI certificates using
ECC. A traditional PKI certificate binds a public key to an entity ID through
a digital signature of the certificate authority, which can be denoted as explicit
binding because of the existence of an explicit signature. On the other hand,
an implicit certificate does not include an explicit signature of the certificate
authority to achieve binding. Instead, it uses a public reconstruction value gen-
erated by the entity and the certificate authority together. Other nodes can
compute the entity public key from the public reconstruction value. ECQV
implicit certificate, with considering the key small size for ECC, can achieve a
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significantly smaller certificate size when compared with traditional certificates
that use explicit biding. Moreover, the signing and verification mechanism em-
ployed with ECQV, with considering proper hardware implementation of ECC,
can achieve more efficient computing certificates, as compared with the regu-
lar certificates. With a proper definition of a certificate revocation mechanism,
ECQV certificate can be a very good choice for PKI certificates within a DTN
environment.
Adapting a PKI lightweight certificate management mechanism within the
super node system is a very interesting topic that needs further research, as
introduced in Chapter 7.
6.7 Summary
This chapter mainly investigates how to limit unauthorized traffic within a
MANET as a major component of the super node system. The proposed
schemes are mainly adjusted to fit delay tolerant network based MANETs that
serves as access networks within the super node architecture. We adopt tra-
ditional public key infrastructure (PKI) based certificates to solve the prob-
lem under consideration. We also propose a new technique based on an idea
of separating the message authorization and message sender authentication at
intermediate nodes. The new technique uses symmetric key cryptography to
reduce the overhead from that when using asymmetric key cryptography. We
discuss how to achieve end-to-end message exchanges by extending the pro-
posed approach. The proposed scheme moves the mutual authentication phase
from mobile nodes to their super nodes for fast and reliable implementation.
Computer simulation results demonstrate that 1) the proposed schemes achieve
better utilization of the network resources by limiting unauthorized traffic, 2)
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the symmetric key based scheme outperforms the asymmetric key based scheme
in terms of intermediate node computing power saving, and 3) the dominating
set based routing outperforms the epidemic routing under the proposed infor-
mation security scheme, in terms of the required number of forwarded messages,
at the cost of increased number of lost messages and a slightly increased number






The objective of this research is to achieve end-to-end information delivery over
virtually continuous connectivity to roaming users with intermittent radio links
over heterogeneous terrestrial wireless access networks. Regular network proto-
cols fail to provide successful communications due to users’ frequent disconnec-
tions and long disconnection periods. We propose a system architecture that is
based on the store-and-forward message delivery strategy used in a DTN, using
the idea of super nodes. A super node traces the location of a roaming user and
acts as the user’s delegate when the user is unavailable. Routing over the super
node architecture is a real challenge for networks with no infrastructure such as
mobile ad-hoc networks. We propose a new routing technique for mobile ad-hoc
networks. This technique introduces the new concept of virtual network topol-
ogy. We further propose the idea of analyzing node mobility model to better
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estimate the contact probability. We extend the proposed routing technique by
employing the mobility model analysis results to achieve better performance.
Due to inability to control message routes over the super node architecture,
new security techniques should be considered to satisfy the system constraints.
We introduce two security techniques to secure message exchanges and to con-
trol the network access. The accomplishments in this thesis are summarized as
follows:
• The super node architecture: The problem of intermittent connections in
wireless networks has been addressed in the literature. The store-and-
forward technique is introduced for successful communications over chal-
lenged networks. We explore the DTN architecture for application over
heterogeneous wireless networks to support user roaming. Then, we study
the problem of routing over DTN networks, and overview the different
routing efforts in this field and how they relate to our research problem.
Based on the DTN architecture, the system model of the super node ar-
chitecture is proposed as a solution for providing a virtual connectivity for
users roaming over heterogeneous wireless networks. The super node ap-
proach is compared with other possible approaches also based on the DTN
store-and-forward technique for message delivery. A simulation study is
presented, which shows the effectiveness of the super node approach, in
terms of, the number of undelivered messages and the total number of
message exchanges. The super node approach outperforms the epidemic
based approach, especially for networks with a large number of nodes.
• Dominating set based routing : In Chapter 4, we focus on routing for net-
works that have no infrastructures such as MANETs. The new concept
of virtual network topology for a DTN is proposed. The virtual topology
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is argued to be a better representation of DTN based networks. Unlike
the traditional network topology that represents the current physical con-
nections among nodes, the virtual topology represents the probabilities
of future connections (i.e., contacts) among nodes. Based on the virtual
network topology, a new routing technique is proposed. The routing tech-
nique is based on calculating a connected dominating set for the virtual
network topology. We propose a new greedy algorithm to calculate the
dominating set for the virtual topology. A new technique is presented to
estimate the probability of future contacts based on the duration of previ-
ous contacts among nodes. The simulation study shows that the proposed
dominating set routing is more efficient than the epidemic routing in terms
of network resource utilization, and that using the contact duration to es-
timate the probability of future contacts is more effective than using the
number of previous contacts.
• Node mobility analysis and improved routing : To further enhance the sys-
tem performance, in Chapter 5, we propose to employ the node mobility
model to better estimate the probability of contacts. A detailed anal-
ysis of the proposed node mobility model is presented, which finds the
distribution of node inter-meeting times. Based on the distribution, we
propose a new algorithm for dominating set calculation that can improve
the system performance by reducing the size of the selected dominating
set. The simulation study demonstrates how the newly proposed algo-
rithm performs in comparison with other algorithms. Moreover, the idea
of randomly selecting the dominating set for the virtual topology is dis-
cussed. It is shown that the random selection technique gives very poor
results in comparison with the other proposed techniques. This shows
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that reducing the dominating set size only does not improve the system
performance if the dominating set members are not selected accurately.
• Preventing unauthorized messages and achieving end-to-end message se-
curity : In Chapter 6, we address some security challenges within the super
node system. We focus on the problem of unauthorized network resource
usage for a network with no infrastructure within the super node system.
We propose to adapt PKI certificate to solve this problem and discuss the
pros and cons of using this solution. Further, we introduce the new idea
of separating message legitimate check problem from the message sender
authentication problem. Our new technique uses the concept of one-way
key chain to address this problem. We further introduces the challenges to
provide secure end-to-end message exchange over the super node system.
Our new solution uses symmetric key cryptography to reduce the compu-
tational overhead introduced by asymmetric key cryptography techniques.
A simulation study is conducted that demonstrate how effective the pro-
posed technique and how these techniques perform under the different
employed DTN routing techniques
7.2 Further Research
In this thesis, we have studied some key research issues related to achieving
virtualy continuous connectivity for roaming users over heterogeneous wireless
networks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approaches,
however our investigations also reveal other important research directions to fur-
ther improve the proposed system performance. This research can be extended
in several directions, as addressed in the following:
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• The super node system reliability : During this research it is assumed
that the super nodes are reliable in terms of computations and inter-
communications. A very interesting challenge is how the system can tol-
erate the failure of one or more of the super nodes. Some techniques, such
as node replication, should be applied to ensure system reliability.
• System scalability and load balancing : System scalability is another main
concern that needs to be considered for actual implementation of the pro-
posed system. The proposed system should support thousands of users
while maintaining acceptable quality of service for each user. In Chapter
3 we present the custody transfer as a solution to achieve load balancing
among super nodes and reduce the communications cost; however this
needs to be further investigated under specific system design constraints.
• Buffer management : The buffer management in the routing techniques
studied in this thesis employs a simple scheme of removing the oldest
message in case of overflow. Many recent studies such as [134, 135] ad-
dress the problem of buffer management strategies for the DTNs. The
proposed routing scheme should be studied under other more intelligent
buffer management schemes for better performance.
• PKI lightweight certificates : Using lightweight certificates to improve the
super node system security is a subject that needs further investigation.
Using the ECQV implicit certificate scheme introduced in Section 6.6.2
instead of the regular certificate is a promising direction of research that
needs to be further investigated.
• The dominating set based routing : The proposed routing technique is
mainly considered for MANETs that are part of the super node system.
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Applying the technique to other types of DTNs is an interesting topic, for
example, to a MANET without a DTN gateway. A distributed algorithm
for calculating the dominating set should be developed based on system
constraints. Moreover, without the existence of a gateway and with node
frequent connections/disconnections, a method is needed to dynamically
maintain the dominating set. Dynamically maintaining the calculated
dominating set is still an open issue for research.
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This appendix discuss some definitions and properties of Poisson process [136]
that are used to prove the theorems proposed in Chapter 5.






Definition A.2. A counting process {N(t), t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with
rate λ, λ > 0 if
1. N(0)=0.
2. The process has stationary and independent increments.
3. P{N(h) = 1} = λh + o(h).
4. P{N(h) ≥ 2} = o(h).
A.1 Interarrival Time Distribution
Consider a poisson process {N(t), t ≥ 0}, and let T1 denote the time of the first
event. For n > 1, let Tn denotes the time elapsed between the (n−1) event and
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the n event. The interarrival times is denoted by the sequence {Tn, n = 1, 2, . . .}.
Proposition A.1. The interarrival times {Tn, n = 1, 2, . . .} for a poisson pro-
cess {N(t), t ≥ 0} with rate λ are iid exponential random variables with mean
1
λ
Proof. The first event occurs at time {T1 > t} if and only if no events occurs in
the interval [0, t], thus










P{T2 > t} = E[P{T2 > t | T1}]
However, for a Poisson process we have independent and stationary increments
(by Definition A.2), then:
P{T2 > t | T1 = h} = P{0 events in (h, h + t] | T1 = h} = exp
−λt




of T1. Similarly, it can be proven for any {Tn, n > 1}.
A.2 Classification of Poisson Arrivals
Considering a Poisson process {N(t), t ≥ 0} with rate λ, assume each time an
event occurs it is considered of type x with probability p ,and of type y with
probability 1− p independently of all other events. Let Nx(t) and Ny(t) denote
the number of type x and type y events occurring in [0, t]. The total number of
events at any instance t is N(t) = Nx(t) + Ny(t).
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Proposition A.2. {Nx(t), t ≥ 0} and {Ny(t), t ≥ 0} are Poisson processes with
rates λp and λ(1− p) respectively. Moreover, {Nx(t), t ≥ 0} and {Ny(t), t ≥ 0}
are independent.
Proof. To prove that proposition we need to prove that Nx(t) and Ny(t) satisfies
Definition A.2. Considering Nx(t) and Definition A.2 :
1. As N(0) = 0 then Nx(0) = 0.
2. {Nx(t), t ≥ 0} inherts the stationary and independent increment proerties
of the process {N(t), t ≥ 0}.
3. P{Nx(h) = 1} = P{Nx(h) = 1 | N(h) = 1}P{N(h) = 1}
+ P{Nx(h) = 1 | N(h) ≥ 2}P{N(h) ≥ 2}
P{Nx(h) = 1} = p(λh + o(h)) + o(h) = λph + o(h)
4. P{Nx(h) ≥ 2} ≤ P{N(h) ≥ 2} = o(h)
It is clear that {Nx(t), t ≥ 0} satisfies Definition A.2. As a result, {Nx(t), t ≥ 0}
is a Poisson process with rate λp. A similar argument for {Ny(t), t ≥ 0} will
show that it is a Poisson process with rate λ(1 − p). the probability of type x
event in the interval (t, t + h) is independent of all that occurs in intervals that
do not overlap with this interval, so it is independent of knowledge of when type





In our simulation experiments, we use a discrete event simulator written in
visual C sharp and MATLAB. In this section, we give a detailed overview of
the simulation details.
At the initialization phase of a simulation, the number of nodes and the
buffer size of each node are specified by the simulation parameters. In simulating
the super node scheme, a number of super nodes is generated based on the
number of super nodes parameter. Nodes are assigned statically to the super
nodes, such as all the super nodes are assigned the same number of nodes (e.g.,
in case of 100 nodes and 4 super nodes, super node with ID 1 is assigned nodes
with ID 1− 25). At the end of the initialization phase, all nodes are associated
randomly with the available networks.
For each node, a sequence of events in the simulation duration is generated
randomly as follows. The events are connection, disconnection and movement
events. The connection event specifies a random network ID to connect to and a
network residence duration ( generated as an exponential random variable with
mean equal to the network mean residence time parameter). For simplicity, all
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nodes have the same network mean residence time in all the networks. As the
network residence duration expires, a disconnection event or a movement event
will occur. In the case of a disconnection event, the disconnection duration is
generated as an exponential random variable with mean equal to the discon-
nection mean time parameter. After the disconnection duration, a connection
event is generated where the node reconnects to its previous network or to a new
network with probabilities specified in the simulation parameters. In the case
of a movement event, the node connects through a new network for a duration
that is generated as an exponential random variable with a mean equal to the
mean network residence time parameter.
As the simulation starts, message generation is done at every simulation
step. Each connected node generates a new message with probability 0.5 and it
chooses the message destination randomly. All messages are assigned the same
time to live (i.e., TTL) in units of simulation steps, which is specified by the
TTL parameter. A message is sent over the network where the source node
resides. If the node is connected to a WLAN or a cellular network, the message
is delivered to the network gateway directly. In the case of a MANET, the
message is forwarded to all nodes connected to the source node and stored at
their local buffers. The message is forwarded at later simulation steps to other
nodes until it reaches the gateway. When the message reaches the gateway, the
message is forwarded to the destination super node (for the super node scheme )
or forwarded to all attached gateways (in epidemic routing scheme). The super
node forwards the message to the gateway of the network where the destination
node resides. The gateway delivers the message to the destination directly, in
the case of a WLAN or a cellular network, or to the nodes connected to the
gateway in the case of a MANET.
The MANET network coverage is simulated as a square area divided into
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square partitions, the number of partitions is specified in the simulation pa-
rameters. A node moves according to the node speed parameter. Nodes within
the same partition are connected and can exchange messages; however, there is
no inter-partition communication. The network gateway is fixed at a partition
randomly chosen in the simulation initialization phase and remains fixed for
the simulation duration. The gateway, similar to other nodes, can exchange
messages only with nodes within its partition. Every node connected to the
MANET makes a random movement over the network coverage partitions with
a speed equal to the node speed parameter.
The MAC layer is assumed to be ideal. The number of messages that can
be transferred per simulation step is specified by the simulation parameters. In
case of a disconnection occurring before completing all messages transfer, only
a subset of the messages is transferred.
At each simulation step, nodes are processed in ascending order of their
IDs. Each node updates its message buffer by decrementing messages TTL field
and by discarding any expired messages (whose TTL=0). A daemon thread
examines a global buffer where references to all generated messages are stored
in it, wherever a message is expired, it checks if its destination reported the
reception of this message or not. If an expired message is not marked as received,
it is marked as lost (i.e., undelivered). Counters are updated to reflect the
number of received and undelivered messages. Statistics are collected and logged
to a specific log file, for every predefined number of simulation steps that is
determined by a simulation parameter.
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